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CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE 
BANKING SUPERVISION: AN 
ENFORCEABLE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL STANDARD? 
Duncan E. Alford*
Abstract: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision serves as an 
international forum to discuss international bank supervision issues. 
Because of the gravity and frequency of banking crises since the demise of 
the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s, international ªnancial 
standards have emerged as a method to minimize these crises. In 1998, 
the Basel Committee issued a comprehensive standard on bank super 
vision that built upon its work over the previous two and a half decades. 
In this Article, the author analyzes this comprehensive standard—the 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision—and assesses its 
implementation in the European Union, the United Kingdom, France, 
the United States, and the Hong Kong SAR. The author then analyzes the 
options available to enforce this “soft law” and comments on the effec 
tiveness of these options, including the surveillance programs of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and certain provisions 
of the Revised Capital Accord of 2004. Despite the improvements repre 
sented by the Core Principles, the author suggests future changes in the 
international bank supervisory regime. 
Introduction 
 Banking is typically one of the most regulated industries within a 
nation’s economy because it serves as the economy’s payment mecha-
nism, gathering ªnancial assets and redeploying them for productive 
purposes through loans and other types of credit.1 Because banking 
and its payment function are so crucial to an economy’s operation, na-
tional governments tend to regulate this industry heavily and occasion-
                                                                                                                      
* Head of Reference, Georgetown University Law Library, Washington, D.C. The au-
thor wishes to thank the Van Calker Foundation and the Swiss Institute of Comparative 
Law for their generous support of the research for this article, which was principally con-
ducted at the Swiss Institute in Lausanne, Switzerland during the summer of 2004. 
1 See Robert E. Krainer, Banking in a Theory of the Business Cycle: A Model and Critique of 
the Basle Accord on Risk-Basel Capital Requirements for Banks, 21 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 413, 
414 (2001). 
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ally even own banks.2 As international trade has grown, each nation’s 
banking system has likewise become more international. World mer-
chandise trade increased from US$ 579 billion in 1973 to US$ 6,272 
billion in 2002.3 International bank loans increased from US$ 2,713.7 
billion in 1985 to US$ 20,212.9 billion in 20034—a 744% increase. 
 Despite this growth in international banking, national govern-
ments have been very hesitant to enter into international agreements 
that involve ceding regulatory control of banks incorporated or oper-
ating within their jurisdictions. National governments tend to view 
any transfer of regulatory control over their banking systems as akin 
to a surrender of sovereign power.5
 National governments generally wish to retain control over bank-
ing systems because of the high costs and negative political repurcus-
sions of bank failures.6 National governments, and related agencies 
such as a central banks, typically have lender of last resort responsibility 
for banks operating within their borders.7 If a bank has insufªcient liq-
uid funds to meet payment demands from depositors, the national gov-
ernment, through its central bank, may lend funds to the bank to meet 
these demands.8 Furthermore, if a bank becomes insolvent, the na-
tional government can provide funds to the depositors of the failed 
bank through a deposit insurance program, allowing depositors to re-
coup losses caused by the insolvency (or a signiªcant portion thereof).9 
Several articles have documented the costs of resolving banking crises 
as a percentage of the national Gross Domestic Product.10 For example, 
the cost of an early 1990s banking crisis in Finland amounted to 11% of 
                                                                                                                      
2 See Wendy Dobson & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, World Capital Markets 95, 103–04 
(2001); Richard Dale, International Banking Regulation, in International Financial 
Market Regulation 193–94 (Benn Steil ed., 1994); Rolf H. Weber, Challenges for the New 
Financial Architecture, 31 H.K. L.J. 241, 246 (2001). 
3 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics, Table 11.2, at 32 (2003), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its2003_e.pdf. 
4 International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Bank for Int’l Settlements 
Q. Rev., Mar. 7, 2005, Annex, at A52 tbl.8A, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/ 
r_qa0503.pdf. 
5 See Dale, supra note 2, at 187. 
6 Dobson & Hufbauer, supra note 2, at 101–02. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 102, 106. 
10 Morris Goldstein, The Case for an International Banking Standard, at vii 
(1997); see David G. Mayes et al., Improving Banking Supervision 258, 260 (2001). See 
generally Huw Evans, International Financial Architecture: Learning the Lessons of History, 2 J. 
Int’l Fin. Mgmt. 70 (2000). 
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its GDP.11 Likewise, a ªnancial crisis in Mexico from 1994 to 1995 cost 
20% of that country’s GDP, and a crisis in Thailand in the late 1990s 
cost 42% of its GDP.12 If a systemic ªnancial crisis results from such 
bank failures, the associated economic costs can increase exponentially. 
Furthermore, a major disruption in the ªnancial system generally leads 
to a change in government. 
 Since the early 1970s national governments have agreed to inter-
national ªnancial standards that set guidelines for best practice in regu-
lating banks and, in particular, internationally active banks.13 These 
standards, however, are not legally enforceable. They are merely soft 
law, voluntary guidelines on regulatory and supervisory practices over 
the banking industry.14 The most prominent institution issuing these 
standards for the banking industry has been the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (“Basel Committee” or “Committee”). 
 This Article analyzes one of these international ªnancial stan-
dards—the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (“Core 
Principles”)15 and in particular the mechanisms available to enforce 
this soft law. The ªrst Section describes the Basel Committee’s history 
and structure. It analyzes the Basel Committee’s earlier pronounce-
ments on bank supervisory practices, particularly those regarding the 
coordination of international bank supervision. The second Section 
analyzes the implementation of the Core Principles in the national 
laws of ªve important ªnancial markets: the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, France, Hong Kong, and the United States. The 
third Section discusses the options for enforcement of the Core Prin-
ciples, including key provisions of the recently issued Revised Capital 
Accord (or Basel II) that effectively buttress the Core Principles. The 
                                                                                                                      
11 Glenn Hoggarth et al., Costs of Banking System Instability: Some Empiri-
cal Evidence 15 tbl.A (Bank of England, Working Paper No. 144, 2001). 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., George Alexander Walker, International Banking Regulation: Law, 
Policy and Practice 17 (2001); Bank for Int’l Settlements, History of the Basel 
Committee and its Membership, at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc101.pdf (Mar. 2004). 
14 Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking 
Supervision, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 4 (1998). Soft law is “an international rule created by a 
group of speciªc national authorities and adopted into their nations’ laws or administra-
tive codes.” Id. 
15 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (1997), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 405, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbsc102.pdf [hereinafter Core Principles]. 
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ªnal Section forecasts future development in the Core Principles. The 
formulation of such developments is an “iterative process.”16
I. Development of Core Principles 
 After World War II, the Allied nations created several international 
institutions to manage the international ªnancial system (“Bretton 
Woods”).17 One of the key attributes of the Bretton Woods system was 
ªxed foreign exchange rates.18 This managed system allowed for 
ªnancial stability, but also created economic inefªciencies. In the early 
1970s, as the result of several factors, this system of managed foreign 
currency rates disintegrated.19 Floating currency rates, at least for the 
industrialized nations, replaced ªxed exchange rates and allowed for 
greater efªciencies and greater growth in both international trade and 
international ªnance.20 Nevertheless, this new, less stable, and more 
volatile international ªnancial system was plagued by many more bank 
crises than were experienced under the Bretton Woods system.21
 As in other nations, U.S. regulation of foreign banks traditionally 
focused on the operations of foreign banks within U.S. borders.22 Yet, 
as ªnancial markets globalized, events in other nations had the poten-
tial to cause dramatic, and sometimes devastating, effects on local 
economies. With the globalization of the banking industry, the sys-
temic risk of a ªnancial crisis has increased, but banking regulation 
among nations has not developed congruently to meet this greater 
risk.23 The Basel Committee, by issuing a series of guidelines for bank 
supervision, attempts to rectify this situation.24 The Basel Committee’s 
                                                                                                                      
16 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Core Principles Methodology 2 (1999), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs61.pdf [hereinafter Core Principles Method-
ology]. 
17 See 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance 234 (Peter Newman 
et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the Bretton Woods system); Axel A. Weber, Sixty Years of 
Bretton Woods—Back to the Future? 1–3, available at http://www.bis.org/review/ 
r040806a.pdf ( July 23, 2004). 
18 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, supra note 17, at 235. 
19 Walker, supra note 13, at 24–26. See generally Ronnie J. Phillips & Richard D. 
Johnson, Regulating International Banking Relations: History and Future Pros-
pects (2000) (outlining the history of international banking regulations). 
20 Walker, supra note 13, at 23. 
21 See Hoggarth et al., supra note 11, at 9. 
22 See generally Michael Gruson & Ralph Reisner, Regulation of Foreign Banks: 
United States and International (2003) (discussing governmental control of foreign 
banks operating within the United States). 
23 See Dale, supra note 2, at 167–68. 
24 See Walker, supra note 13, at 135–36. 
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efforts to harmonize bank regulation have, thus far, culminated with 
the issuance of the Core Principles in September 1997. 
A. Brief History of the Basel Committee 
 The 1974 collapse of the Herstatt Bank in Germany and the 1975 
failure of Franklin National Bank in the United States led to the crea-
tion of the Basel Committee and the issuance of the Concordat, the 
Committe’s ªrst agreement on bank supervision.25 The Herstatt Bank 
failed due to its fraudulent bookkeeping practices, and other German 
banks were unable to rescue it.26 Although legal claims against the Her-
statt Bank were eventually settled, and although mainly domestic assets 
were involved,27 the resolution of the bank’s failure—particularly the 
incomplete satisfaction of foreign creditors’ claims—set a negative 
precedent for the settlement of international ªnancial crises and dem-
onstrated the need for greater regulatory cooperation with respect to 
international banks.28
 The Franklin National Bank (“Franklin”) failure demonstrated 
how the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system left banks more 
exposed to currency rate risk.29 Franklin, at the time the twentieth 
largest bank in the United States, closed in 1974.30 Although weak 
management and a large amount of non-performing loans contrib-
uted to the bank’s failure, Franklin’s collapse occured largely because 
                                                                                                                      
25 See generally Comm. on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Concor-
dat on Supervison of Banks’ Foreign Establishments, in IMF, International Capital Markets: 
Recent Developments and Short Term Prospects 29–32 (Occasional Paper No. 7, 
1981) [hereinafter Concordat]. The original Concordat was not released to the public 
until March 1981. Id. at 29. The original name of the Basel Committee was the Committee 
on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra 
note 13. 
26 See Ulrich Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano Collapse and the Luxury of National Lenders of 
Last Resort with International Responsibilities, 22 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 181, 186—87 
(1990). In addition, the London branch of the Franklin National Bank suffered severe 
losses in the early 1970s, for which the Federal Reserve compensated with liquidity sup-
port. Franklin National Bank eventually failed anyway, illustrating the confusion of super-
visory responsibilities over international banks. See generally Joseph D. Becker, International 
Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290 (1976) (giving full account of the Herstatt 
failure). 
27 Hess, supra note 26, at 186. West German banks received 45%, foreign banks re-
ceived 55%, and other creditors received 65% of their respective claims. Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Walker, supra note 13, at 25. 
30 Id. at 26–27. 
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of foreign exchange trading losses that prompted institutional deposi-
tors to withdraw their funds.31
 The Basel Committee was organized in 1975 in direct response to 
the Herstatt Bank and Franklin failures.32 The Committee’s members 
consist of banking regulators from Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.33 The Basel 
Committee secretariat is located at the ofªces of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.34 Although some observers 
have criticized the Committee for its lack of members from emerging 
markets,35 its pronouncements have regularly included consultations 
with regulators from emerging markets and transition economies.36
 The purpose of the Basel Committee is to provide “regular co-
operation between its member countries on banking supervisory mat-
ters.”37 The Committee seeks to harmonize the banking laws of vari-
ous nations indirectly through the issuance of guidelines developed 
by consensus among its members.38 The discussions held by the Basel 
Committee are conªdential, and the Committee does not publish 
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. at 27–28. 
32 Richard Dale, The Regulation Of International Banking 172 (1984); Ethan B. 
Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations, 
43 Int’l Org. 323, 328–29 (1989). For a detailed discussion on the Basel Committee, see 
Walker, supra note 13, at 17–162 (2001). 
33 Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 13. See generally Marilyn B. Cane & David 
A. Barclay, Competitive Inequality: American Banking in the International Arena, 13 B.C. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 273, 319 n.321 (1990) (providing background on the Bank for International 
Settlements and the Committee). 
34 Bank for Int’l Settlements, 74th Annual Report 157 (2004). Two deputy direc-
tors are permanent staff at the Bank for International Settlements. The remaining profes-
sional staff of the Basel Committee are on loan from member nations. See The Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision, at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/aboutbcbs.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 
2005). 
35 See, e.g., Howard Davies, Is the Global Regulatory System Fit for Purpose in 
the 21st Century? 5–7, available at http://www.bis.org/review/r030606g.pdf (May 20, 
2003). 
36 Core Principles, supra note 15, at 1–2. The Basel Committee was very inºuential in 
the creation of regional bank supervisory groups such as the Offshore Group of Banking 
Supervisors. These groups serve as forums for the Basel Committee to communicate 
efªciently with its peers in emerging markets. See, e.g., Fin. Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering, Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, at http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/Ctry-
orgpages/org-ogbs_en.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). 
37 Peter Cooke, The Basle “Concordat” on Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments, 39 
Aussenwirtschaft 151, 151 (1984). 
38 See id. 
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minutes.39 The Committee does, however, publish its ªndings, and 
recent standards have involved much more consultation with non-
member regulatory authorities, as well as the ªnancial services indus-
try and the general public.40 While the Committee has no legal en-
forcement power itself, it encourages member nations to abide by 
these regulatory guidelines and to use whatever authority they possess 
to enact and enforce them.41 Typically, the Basel Committee stan-
dards are endorsed at the biennial meeting of the International Con-
ference of Banking Supervisors.42 The Committee has issued several 
guidelines on international banking supervision: the Concordat of 
1975 (“Concordat”);43 the Revised Concordat;44 the Capital Adequacy 
Standards (“Basel I”),45 the Minimum Standards for the Supervision 
of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establish-
ments (“Minimum Standards”),46 the Core Principles,47 and, most 
                                                                                                                      
39 Bank for Int’l Settlements, supra note 13. The Basel Committee used to keep 
minutes of its meetings. Currently, the Committee keeps a detailed action plan as the only 
written record of its meetings. These documents are for internal use only and are not 
available to the public. See Carl Felsenfeld & Genci Bilali, The Role of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements in Shaping the World Financial System, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 945, 964 
(2004). 
40 See, e.g., Core Principles, supra note 15, at 1. Prior to completing the ªnal document, 
the Basel Committee issued three separate consultative papers and three quantitative impact 
studies and reviewed hundreds of comments from the ªnancial services industry and the gen-
eral public. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 1 (Basel Comm. 
Publ’n No. 107, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf. 
41 See Core Principles, supra note 15, at 2. 
42 The International Conference of Banking Supervisors is a biennial conference of bank 
supervisors from around the world. Sponsored by the Basel Committee, the latest conference 
was held in Madrid, Spain, in September 2004. See Global Bank Regulators Mull New Rules Re-
write, Reuters News, Sept. 21, 2004, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/040921/137/2g77g.html; 
Top Bank Regulator Urges Closer Cross-border Work, Reuters News, Sept. 22, 2004, at 1. 
43 Concordat, supra note 25. 
44 Comm. on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, Revised Basle 
Concordat on Principles for the Supervision of Banks’ Foreign Establishments, 
22 I.L.M. 900, 901 (1983) [hereinafter Revised Concordat]. 
45 Comm. on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, in 51 Banking Rep. 
(BNA) 143 (1998), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf [hereinafter Capi-
tal Adequacy Standards]. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International 
Capital Adequacy Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 Dick. J. Int’l 
L. 189 (1992) (analyzing the Capital Adequacy Standards and their impact on the banking 
industry). 
46 Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards for the Supervision 
of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments (1992), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc314.pdf [hereinafter Minimum Standards]. 
47 Core Principles, supra note 15. 
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recently, the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (“Revised Capital Accord” or 
“Basel II”).48 Appendix A contains a brief timeline of the Basel Com-
mittee’s principal standards. The Core Principles and their enforce-
ability are the main focus of this Article. 
B. The Concordat of 1975 
 As a result of the Herstatt Bank failure and the subsequent con-
fusion over the settlement of the bank’s liabilities, the Committee 
sought to establish an agreement on the respective roles of home 
country supervisors to ensure supervision over all international 
ªnancial institutions.49 The Committee attempted to fulªll this task by 
issuing the Concordat, which delineated the supervisory responsibili-
ties of home and host country regulators over international banks.50 
By entitling the document a “concordat,” the Committee indicated 
that the agreement was not a binding treaty,51 but instead a set of 
guidelines on bank supervision, adopted by consensus among Basel 
Committee members.52
 The objectives of the Concordat were to ensure the adequate 
regulation of foreign banks and the prevention of foreign banks from 
escaping supervision.53 A central tenet of the Concordat was joint re-
sponsibility between home and host countries in regulating interna-
tional banks.54
                                                                                                                      
48 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (2004), available at http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm [hereinafter Revised Capital Accord]. 
49 Richard Dale, Someone Must Be in Charge, Fin. Times London, July 22, 1991, at 12. 
50 The home or parent regulator is responsible for supervision in the country where 
the “parent bank” is headquartered and licensed. See Concordat, supra note 25, at 30. 
The host regulator is responsible for supervision in the foreign country where the “parent 
bank” is operating an establishment. See id. 
51 M.S. Mendelsohn, New Basel Concordat: Main Deªciency Is Intact, Am. Banker, June 16, 
1983, at 2. 
52 See id. The word “concordat” refers to a “public act of agreement” (as opposed to a 
“contract” between private parties). Id. 
53 Concordat, supra note 25, at 29–30; see Cane & Barclay, supra note 33, at 321. 
54 Dale, supra note 32, at 12. The Concordat set forth ªve principles: 
 (1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint 
responsibility of host and parent authorities. 
 (2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each 
country should ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised, 
and supervision should be adequate as judged by both host and parent au-
thorities. 
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 The Concordat dealt primarily with the liquidity, solvency, and for-
eign exchange operations of foreign banks.55 The host supervisory au-
thority was responsible for regulating liquidity, regardless of the type of 
banking entity established in the host nation.56 The Concordat allo-
cated responsibility for solvency between host and home regulators de-
pending on the type of foreign banking establishment involved; sub-
sidiaries and joint ventures were the responsibility of the host regulator, 
while branches were the responsibility of the home regulator.57
 The Concordat had several weaknesses. First, despite its attempts 
to allocate supervisory responsibility, it still left unclear which regulator 
should act to contain a major bank failure.58 Also, designation of the 
host supervisor as the primary solvency regulator of foreign bank sub-
sidiaries ran contrary to the system of consolidated supervision used in 
most industrialized nations.59 The allocations of responsibility in the 
Concordat presented a risk that host regulators, following consolidated 
                                                                                                                      
 (3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of 
host authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to lo-
cal practices for their liquidity management and must comply with local regu-
lations. 
 (4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially a 
matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary re-
sponsibility lies with the host authority, parent authorities should take ac-
count of the exposure of their domestic banks’ moral commitment in this re-
gard. 
 (5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of information 
between host and parent authorities and by the granting of permission for in-
spections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host au-
thority. Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (particu-
larly in the ªeld of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which might 
hinder these forms of cooperation. 
W. Peter Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organiztions: Evolving Techniques for Coop-
eration Among Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. Comp. Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 244, 246 (1981); see 
also Richard Dale, Basle Concordat: Lessons from Ambrosiano, The Banker, Sept. 1983, at 55 
(summarizing the Concordat). 
55 See Concordat, supra note 25, at 29. 
56 See id. at 30. Liquidity is a measure of a bank’s ability to convert assets to cash or 
cash-equivalents without diminution of the assets’ value. Jerry M. Rosenberg, Diction-
ary of Banking & Financial services 415 (1985). 
57 Concordat, supra note 25, at 30–31. Solvency is a measure of a bank’s ability to 
generate cash ºow sufªcient to satisfy its liabilities as they mature and to provide an ade-
quate return to its shareholders. Black’s Law Dictionary 1428 (8th ed. 2004). 
58 See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of 
Banking Regulations, 43 Int’l Org. 323, 330 (1989). 
59 Dale, supra note 32, at 173. Under consolidated supervision, responsibility for regu-
lating a bank’s foreign subsidiaries is shared between host and parent regulators, with the 
parent supervisor considering all of the assets and liabilities of the bank, wherever located, 
in order to determine the bank’s overall solvency. See id. at 176. 
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supervision, would look to parent supervisors to regulate a bank sub-
sidiary’s solvency, while parent regulators, relying upon language in the 
Concordat, would look to the host supervisor to perform this task.60
 Finally, the Concordat lacked speciªc supervisory standards for 
Committee members to employ,61 allowing individual nations to in-
terpret the Concordat in inconsistent manners.62 The most important 
and potentially dangerous interpretation involved the mistaken belief 
that lender of last resort responsibility accompanied supervisory re-
sponsibility.63 The Committee never intended the Concordat to deal 
with lender of last resort responsibility.64
 The 1982 ªnancial collapse of the Luxembourg subsidiary of 
Banco Ambrosiano, the largest Italian bank at the time, highlighted 
the weaknesses of the Concordat. The Luxembourg subsidiary had 
made US$ 1.4 billion worth of imprudent loans to Latin American 
companies.65 Concurrently, the subsidiary owed nearly US$ 450 mil-
lion to other creditors.66 Unable to pay its creditors, Banco Ambro-
siano and its Luxembourg subsidiary collapsed.67
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. at 173. The “primary motivation” for drafting the Revised Concordat, adopted in 
1983, was to “incorporate understandings on applying the principle of consolidated super-
vision to banks’ international business.” Cooke, supra note 37, at 152–53. 
61 Dale, supra note 32, at 173. 
62 In 1979, the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”) proposed that U.S. ofªces of foreign 
banks report on the structure and condition of their parent banks to the FRB, but regula-
tors in other nations thought this requirement would violate provisions of the Concordat. 
Id. The Federal Reserve eventually received power to enforce such a reporting require-
ment under the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act. Id. On another occasion, the 
FRB was faced with a three-way international disagreement as to the Concordat’s meaning. 
Id. Swiss regulators believed that host regulators had primary responsibility for regulating 
branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks. Id. In contrast, regulators in Great Britain be-
lieved that host regulators were responsible for supervising only foreign bank subsidiaries. 
Id. Bank regulators in the Netherlands, in yet another interpretation, believed that the 
parent regulator was responsible for the supervision of its subsidiaries. Id. at 173–74. 
63 Id. at 174. “Lender of last resort responsibility” refers to the obligation of a central 
bank or regulator to provide as much liquidity as necessary to a bank in order to meet its 
obligations to depositors and creditors. Id. 
64 See Cooke, supra note 37, at 153–54. The Concordat is silent on this point. See id. 
65 See Hess, supra note 26, at 188–89, 191. 
66 Id. at 190. 
67 See Hess, supra note 26, at 189–90; Ronnie J. Phillips & Richard D. Johnson, Regulat-
ing International Banking: Rationale, History and Prospects, in The New Financial Architec-
ture: International Banking Regulation in the 21st Century 1–22 (Benton E. Gup 
ed., 2000). 
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 Neither the Luxembourg nor the Italian regulators claimed su-
pervisory or lender of last resort responsibility for the bank.68 The 
Italian regulators argued that they lacked the legal authority to regu-
late the Luxembourg subsidiary and bore little or no responsibility for 
its failure.69 Italian regulators pointed to the way that their previous 
attempts to examine Banco Ambrosiano’s South American ofªces 
were rebuffed by local regulators as proof of their inability to regulate 
Banco Ambrosiano’s foreign subsidiaries. Italian regulators argued 
that they would not take responsibility for the failure of a bank they 
were not permitted to supervise properly.70 Luxembourg regulators, 
on the other hand, ignored Italian requests to tighten their supervi-
sion of the Banco Ambrosiano subsidiary, believing that a subsidiary 
operating under the same name as its parent bank (as was the case 
with the Luxembourg subsidiary of Banco Ambrosiano) should have 
been supported either by the parent bank or indirectly by the central 
bank in the parent bank’s home country.71 Thus, Luxembourg regu-
lators believed that the Banco Ambrosiano parent bank or the Italian 
central bank should have supported the Luxembourg subsidiary.72
C. The Revised Concordat of 1983 
 The Committee responded to the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano 
by issuing the Revised Concordat in 1983.73 The Revised Concordat 
was not an entirely new agreement, rather it built upon the original 
Concordat.74 Like its predecessor, it was a non-binding agreement 
that embodied “recommended guidelines of best practices.”75 Under 
                                                                                                                      
68 Dale, supra note 32, at 175; see Maximilian J.B. Hall, Financial Deregulation: A 
Comparative Study of Australia and the United Kingdom 202 n.32 (1987) (describ-
ing the Banco Ambrosiano collapse and its resolution). 
69 Dale, supra note 32, at 175; Hess, supra note 26, at 192. 
70 Hess, supra note 26, at 192–93. 
71 See Dale, supra note 32, at 175; Dale, supra note 54, at 57. The turmoil resulting 
from Banco Ambrosiano’s failure ended when two settlement agreements were signed: the 
ªrst between the liquidators of Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the Luxembourg 
holding company (and its foreign subsidiaries); and the second between the creditors of 
Banco Ambrosiano and the creditors of the Vatican bank. Hess, supra note 26, at 194–95. 
In the aftermath of the Banco Ambrosiano affair, the Italian Parliament passed a law that 
required disclosure of the shareholder structure of banks and also passed enabling legisla-
tion for the 1983 European Union Council Directive on Supervision. Id. at 199. 
72 Hess, supra note 26, at 191. 
73 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 901; see Dale, supra note 49, at 12. 
74 See Hall, supra note 68, at 166; Cooke, supra note 37, at 152–53; see also Revised 
Concordat, supra note 44, at 901 (using the original Concordat as a foundation). 
75 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 901. 
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the Revised Concordat, nations still retained authority to license 
banks with few restrictions—even banks they were unable to regulate 
effectively.76 Furthermore, it provided no incentive for compliance 
with its provisions other than the political pressure that bank regula-
tors could exercise on their recalcitrant colleagues.77 Nevertheless, 
with the Revised Concordat, the Committee attempted to close the 
supervisory gaps that existed under the original Concordat and di-
rectly address the adequacy of foreign bank regulation. 
1. “Dual Key” Supervision 
 As with the original Concordat, a primary objective of the Re-
vised Concordat was to ensure that no foreign bank escaped supervi-
sion, and that each establishment was supervised adequately.78 The 
Revised Concordat introduced a “dual key” approach whereby both 
home and host supervisory authorities assessed the quality of the 
other’s supervision of an internationally active bank.79 The host juris-
diction had to be satisªed with the supervision over the parent bank 
within its home jurisdiction; likewise, the parent bank’s home jurisdic-
tion had to be satisªed that the foreign operations of its domestic 
banks were supervised adequately by the host regulators.80
 If the host regulator considered the parent regulator’s supervi-
sion insufªcient, the host regulator had the right to discourage or 
prohibit the foreign bank from operating within its jurisdiction or to 
set stringent conditions for the bank’s continued operation therein.81 
Likewise, the parent regulator could attempt to extend its jurisdic-
tional reach if it did not believe that the host regulator was providing 
adequate supervision.82 Alternatively, it could discourage or prohibit 
the parent bank from operating in the host nation.83 Using this “dual 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2 (criticizing the Basel Committee for repeating 
its failure to address lender of last resort responsibility in the Revised Concordat). 
77 See id. (noting that the Revised Concordat remained “no more than an informal 
agreement”). 
78 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 903; see Dale, supra note 2, at 169. 
79 See Dale, supra note 49, at 12. 
80 Id.; see Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 903–04. The “dual key” approach is 
highly dependent on effective communication and active cooperation among host and 
parent regulators. See Dale, supra note 49, at 12. 
81 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 903–04; Dale, supra note 32, at 175. This 
provision was a concession to U.S. regulatory authorities, whose previous attempts to 
monitor the status of foreign parent banks with U.S. ofªces were met with strong resistance 
from foreign supervisory authorities. Id. 
82 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 903; see Hess, supra note 26, at 200. 
83 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 903; see Hess, supra note 26, at 200. 
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key” approach, the Committee intended to prevent a “race to the bot-
tom”—the tendency for jurisdictions to relax ªnancial regulation and 
supervision in order to attract more foreign investment.84
 In the Banco Ambrosiano case, no regulator took responsibility 
for the supervision of the Luxembourg-based bank.85 If the Revised 
Concordat principles had been applied to the Banco Ambrosiano 
situation, Luxembourg would have had primary responsibility to su-
pervise the subsidiary, but if the parent regulator (Italy) had not been 
satisªed with that supervision, it could have provided its own supervi-
sion.86 The “dual key” system in the Revised Concordat was designed 
to encourage nations to make their bank supervision practices equiva-
lent to those present in the most stringently regulated ªnancial cen-
ters.87 Such convergence, however, required bank regulators to pro-
hibit weakly regulated banks from operating within their jurisdiction 
and to prevent their own adequately regulated banks from expanding 
into inadequately regulated jurisdictions.88 The ªrst scenario would 
result in the loss of foreign investment, the second in forgone inter-
national business opportunities. 
 The Revised Concordat allocated supervisory responsibility be-
tween host and parent regulators based on both the nature of the 
regulatory objective (e.g., liquidity, solvency) and the type of banking 
establishment.89 The Revised Concordat describes three types of for-
eign banking establishments: branches, subsidiaries, and joint ven-
tures or consortia.90
 The responsibility for foreign bank solvency depended on the 
type of bank establishment. The parent supervisor was responsible for 
regulating branch solvency because the branch was still legally a part 
                                                                                                                      
84 Dale, supra note 49, at 12. 
85 Dale, supra note 32, at 175. 
86 See Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 903. The Revised Concordat calls for a 
concerned parent regulator to extend its supervision in such a manner “to the degree that 
it is practicable.” Id. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See Hall, supra note 68, at 166–68 (providing a succinct summary of the Revised 
Concordat). 
90 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 902. A branch does not have a separate legal 
status from the parent bank. Id. A subsidiary is a legally independent entity that is wholly-
owned or majority-owned by the parent bank. Id. Joint ventures or consortia are “legally 
independent institutions incorporated in the country where their principal operations are 
conducted and controlled by two or more parent institutions, most of which are usually 
foreign and not all of which are necessarily banks.” Id.; see Hal S. Scott, Supervision of Inter-
national Banking: Post-BCCI, 8 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 487, 487–510 (1992). 
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of the parent bank.91 Parent and host supervisors had joint responsi-
bility for subsidiaries.92 The host supervisor had some responsibility 
because the subsidiary was a legally independent institution; the par-
ent supervisor had responsibility because of the principle of consoli-
dated supervision (described below) and the effect of the subsidiary’s 
activities on the overall ªnancial status of the parent bank.93 Supervi-
sion over the solvency of joint ventures was primarily the responsibility 
of the regulator in the joint venture’s country of incorporation.94
 Under the Revised Concordat, liquidity referred to the ability of a 
foreign bank to meet its obligations as they fell due; it did not refer to 
lender of last resort responsibilities.95 Host regulators were primarily 
responsible for supervising the liquidity of branches and subsidiar-
ies.96 Parent regulators could also be concerned with liquidity, be-
cause branches may call upon the resources of the parent bank and 
the parent bank may issue comfort letters or other standby credit in-
struments to its subsidiaries.97 For joint ventures, the country of in-
corporation had primary responsibility over liquidity.98
2. Consolidated Supervision 
 In addition to the concept of “dual key” supervision, the Revised 
Concordat adopted the principle of consolidated supervision. Under 
this principle, the parent supervisor monitored a parent bank’s risk 
exposure and capital adequacy based on all the operations of the bank, 
wherever conducted.99 The Basel Committee acknowledged that adop-
tion of this concept might extend the traditional jurisdictional limits of 
a parent regulator’s supervisory responsibility.100
 In April 1990, the Basel Committee issued a paper discussing the 
exchange of information among bank supervisors as a supplement to 
                                                                                                                      
91 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 905 
92 Id. at 906. 
93 Id. This provision differs from the original 1975 Concordat, where supervision of a 
subsidiary’s solvency was primarily the responsibility of the host regulator. See Concordat, 
supra note 25, at 31–32. 
94 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 906–07. 
95 Id. at 906. 
96 Id. at 907. 
97 See id. 
98 Id. 
99 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 905; see Dale, supra note 32, at 176. 
100 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 905. 
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the Revised Concordat.101 In this paper, the Committee stressed its 
concern over the prohibition against sharing certain information with 
supervisors in certain countries.102 The Committee then set forth its 
view as to the best practice for sharing prudential information.103 The 
Committee stressed that information received under agreements be-
tween prudential supervisors was to be be used for supervisory pur-
poses only, and that the conªdentiality of the information provided 
must be assured.104 If the recipient authority wished to take action 
based on information received, it ªrst should consult with the sending 
authority.105 The statement sought to outline arrangements that 
would allow for the greatest possible ºow of relevant information 
among bank supervisors.106 Only through trust and shared informa-
tion would bank supervisors be able to monitor international bank 
operations effectively.107
3. Weaknesses of the Revised Concordat 
 Nevertheless, the Revised Concordat, like its predecessor, also 
contained some weaknesses. Its explicit refusal to address the issue of 
lender of last resort responsibility presented one major weakness.108 
Theoretically, if banking regulators cooperate to prevent bank fail-
ures, they should also cooperate in upholding the international bank-
ing system when a failure is imminent.109 The Committee did not ad-
dress lender of last resort responsibility because some members of the 
Committee were not central banks and thus lacked any lending power 
with which to support failing banks.110 More fundamentally, the 
Committee avoided the issue because the central banks of the indus-
trialized nations had stated vaguely that they would support the li-
                                                                                                                      
101 See generally Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Exchanges of Information 
Between Banking and Securities Supervisors (Apr. 1990), available at http://www.bis. 
org/publ/bcbs07a.pdf [hereinafter Exchange Document] (supplementing the Revised 
Concordat). 
102 Id. at 2–3. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 5. 
106 Exchange Document, supra note 101, at 2. 
107 See id. at 3. 
108 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 901 (stating that it does not address lender 
of last resort responsibility); see Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2. 
109 David W. Wise, International Prudential Regulation of Commercial Banks, Bank Admin., 
June 1985, at 58, 62 (stating “[j]ust as laws should provide for their own enforcement, 
supervision should provide for the eventuality that such supervision can fail”). 
110 Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2. 
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quidity of the international markets in times of crisis.111 In drafting 
the Revised Concordat, the central bankers sought to leave this prior 
commitment vague in order to encourage private sector discipline 
and minimize moral hazard.112 The central bankers hoped to create a 
delicate balance between creating conªdence in ªnancial markets 
and discouraging reckless behavior by ªnancial institutions.113
 The Revised Concordat purposely blurred host and parent regu-
latory responsibilities in order to avoid the type of ªnger-pointing that 
occurred among regulators after the Banco Ambrosiano failure.114 In 
doing so, however, it also created problems of overlapping authority 
and responsibility in cases where one regulator was designated the 
primary regulator, but another also had a strong interest in maintain-
ing effective supervision over a foreign bank.115 This overlap created 
uncertainty for regulators with respect to their supervisory responsi-
bilities.116 In theory, the parent regulator should have ultimate re-
sponsibility for the safety and soundness of its banks in all of their 
forms and establishments, foreign and domestic.117 The principle of 
consolidated supervision allows a parent regulator, in the course of 
enforcing its own regulations, to approve or disapprove of its banks’ 
foreign operation.118 Nevertheless, despite signiªcant improvements 
over the original Concordat, the Revised Concordat still left gaps in 
the coordination of international bank regulations. 
 The difªculty of implementing consolidated supervision seemed 
evident from the drafters’ treatment of international bank holding 
companies.119 The Revised Concordat designated the host regulator 
(rather than the parent regulator) as the primary supervisor of subsidi-
ary banks controlled by a bank holding company, but failed to desig-
                                                                                                                      
111 See id. (noting statement of support of Euromarkets still applies). 
112 Id. “Moral hazard” refers to the economic concept whereby an economic actor will 
pursue risky behavior that it otherwise would not have because of an external subsidy. See 
Hidden Actions, Moral Hazard and Contract Theory, 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Money and Finance 304 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992). 
113 See Mendelsohn, supra note 51, at 2. 
114 Wise, supra note 109, at 62. 
115 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 906 (stating that the countries in which joint 
ventures are incorporated (host countries) have primary responsibility for supervising the 
joint venture, but that the parent regulators of banks that are shareholders in the joint 
venture cannot ignore supervision of the joint venture). 
116 Wise, supra note 109, at 62. 
117 Id. 
118 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 906. 
119 See id. at 904. 
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nate a primary regulator of the bank holding company itself.120 This 
omission would prove to be a very signiªcant gap—one that the Bank 
of Commerce and Credit International (“BCCI”) would later exploit.121
 As banks expanded into new and different lines of business, they 
tended to develop complex holding company structures. These at-
tenuated and far-ºung corporate structures, such as the one main-
tained by Banco Ambrosiano, often allowed banks to escape effective 
regulation.122 Under the Revised Concordat, a holding company with 
independent banks operating in different countries could avoid 
meaningful consolidated supervision because no one regulator had 
responsibility for the holding company’s overall ªnancial strength.123 
Likewise, effective supervision of a holding company with both bank 
and non-bank subsidiaries required the cooperation of multiple regu-
lators that differed not only by geography, but also by function (insur-
ance, securities, banking).124
 In the 1980s, BCCI likewise took advantage of a fragmented cor-
porate structure in order to avoid comprehensive regulation.125 In a 
coordinated action on July 5, 1991, regulators in eight nations closed 
all the BCCI branches located within their jurisdictions.126 At the 
time, BCCI had total assets of approximately US$ 20 billion and was 
operating in sixty-nine countries, with the largest concentration of its 
deposits in the United Kingdom.127 Due to the absence of any inter-
                                                                                                                      
120 See id. 
121 See Dale, supra note 49, at 12 (pointing out that BCCI’s structure was such that it 
could avoid stringent consolidated supervision under the Revised Concordat). 
122 Banco Ambrosiano consisted of a parent bank in Italy and several foreign subsidiar-
ies, including banks located in Peru, Panama, and Luxembourg. See Hess, supra note 26, at 
189–90. The Luxembourg subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Holding, itself had a Bahamian 
subsidiary, Banco Ambrosiano Overseas Ltd. See id. at 190. 
123 Revised Concordat, supra note 44, at 904. 
124 See id. 
125 See David Lascelles, First Step Towards Tougher Regulation, Fin. Times (London), Sept. 
2, 1991, at 13. 
126 Max Hall, The BCCI Affair, Banking World, Sept. 1991, at 8. The eight nations were 
the Cayman Islands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States. Id. Indeed, on that day, action to shut down BCCI’s activities 
was taken in more than sixty nations. Id. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee 
Minimum Standards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 Geo. Wash. J. 
Int’l L. & Econ. 241 (1992) (describing the failure of the international bank BCCI and 
the complex, coordinated action by bank regulators to minimize depositors’ losses). 
127 Statement by J. Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, William Taylor, Staff Director, Division of Banking Supervision 
and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and E. Gerald Corri-
gan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 13, 1991, in 77 Fed. Res. 
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national law governing international bank closures, local regulators 
acted under separate national laws.128 The closure of BCCI branches 
continued for several weeks and, by July 29, 1991, forty-four jurisdic-
tions had closed BCCI ofªces located within their borders.129
 The immediate reason for the closure of BCCI was the massive 
fraud committed by BCCI’s senior managers.130 Through the mid-
1980s, the treasury operations of BCCI suffered huge losses, and sen-
ior managers siphoned off deposits to cover them.131 If the depositors 
withdrew their money, then other deposits were diverted to cover the 
losses. This practice resulted in an endless series of fraudulent trans-
actions.132 Senior managers, board members, and representatives of 
major shareholders participated in the fraud by making ªctitious 
loans, failing to record deposits, and dealing in their own shares in 
order to manufacture proªts.133 BCCI also used client names to trade 
on its own account.134 BCCI managers hid the losses caused by bad 
trades, unpaid loans, and fraudulent practices by shuttling assets be-
tween subsidiaries.135
                                                                                                                      
Bull. 902, 905 (1991) [hereinafter Mattingly Statement]. BCCI was no longer accepting 
retail deposits in its U.S. ofªces because of actions taken previously by U.S. bank regula-
tors. Id. at 907. 
128 Cf. Claire Makin, Learning from BCCI, Institutional Investor, Nov. 1991, at 93, 
94–95 (discussing various local investigations into BCCI and the lack of overall interna-
tional accountability). In a 1989 interview, former BCCI chief executive Swaleh Naqvi ac-
knowledged that “[b]ecause we do not have a dominant presence in any single country, 
the full impact of what we are doing is not visible.” Id. at 94. 
129 Mattingly Statement, supra note 127, at 908. 
130 Hall, supra note 126, at 8. The Bank of England had commissioned Price Water-
house to investigate BCCI and issue a report under section 41 of the 1987 Banking Act, 
which permits the investigation of banks on behalf of depositors. Banking Act, 1987, ch. 
22, § 41. 
131 David Lascelles, A Never-ending Spiral of Fraud, Fin. Times(London), Oct. 22, 1991, 
at 32. There are estimates that BCCI raised over US$ 600 million in unrecorded deposits. 
All Things to All Men, Economist, July 27, 1991, at 67–68. 
132 Lascelles, supra note 131, at 32. 
133 Hall, supra note 126, at 8. For example, BCCI reported loans of US$ 445 million to 
Ghaith Pharaon, a Saudi business executive, and US$ 796 million to the Gokal family in 
Pakistan; both borrowers were shareholders of First American Bankshares, which was se-
cretly owned by BCCI. These loans were not secured with any assets, nor were they in fact 
made to the named individuals. See Jonathan Friedland, Rest in Pieces, Far E. Econ. Rev., 
Sept. 26, 1991, at 64, 66. See generally James Ring Adams & Douglas Frantz, A Full Ser-
vice Bank: How BCCI Stole Billions Around The World (1992) (chronicling the 
BCCI affair). 
134 All Things to All Men, supra note 131, at 67. 
135 The Many Facades of BCCI, Economist, July 13, 1991, at 81. In addition, Price 
Waterhouse discovered a secret “bank within a bank,” controlled by top BCCI ofªcials, 
which hid losses and plugged holes in the balance sheets by raising deposits without re-
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 The BCCI affair was “a case of systematic and deliberate criminal 
fraud . . . [in which] BCCI took maximum advantage of an unsuper-
vised cooperate [sic] structure to conceal and warehouse in bank se-
crecy jurisdictions billions of dollars in fraudulent transactions.”136 
BCCI was able to take advantage of technological advances that al-
lowed it to shift funds world-wide very quickly. The BCCI scandal illus-
trates that, as the banking industry becomes global, the potential for 
global fraud or mismanagement grows concurrently. 
 The circumstances surrounding the closure of BCCI called into 
question the “adequacy of international supervisory arrange-
ments.”137 The Basel Committee began discussions of the 
ramiªcations of the BCCI closure almost immediately.138 In light of 
BCCI, the Committee members generally agreed that there was a 
need to strengthen the provisions of the Revised Concordat.139 To this 
end, in July 1992 the Committee issued the Minimum Standards.140
D. Minimum Standards 
 In the Minimum Standards, the Committee tightened its position 
on international bank supervision141 and strengthened the principles 
reºected in the Concordat and the Revised Concordat.142 The Mini-
mum Standards stated that: (1) all international banks and banking 
groups should be supervised by home country regulators; (2) interna-
tional banks should obtain permission from both the host and home 
country regulators before opening branches or other banking estab-
lishments in foreign nations; (3) banking regulators should have the 
right to gather information from international banks; (4) host regula-
tors can impose restrictive measures against the international banks if 
the Minimum Standards are not met; and (5) encouragement of in-
                                                                                                                      
cording them. Id. In 1988 alone, BCCI subsidiaries paid each other US$ 152 million in fee 
income. Id. 
136 Mattingly Statement, supra note 127, at 905. 
137 Hall, supra note 126, at 8. 
138 The new Minimum Standards were issued in July 1992, only a year after BCCI was 
completely closed. See Minimum Standards, supra note 46. The drafters somewhat crypti-
cally noted that they began their work on the standards “[f]ollowing recent develop-
ments.” Id. at 1. 
139 See id. 
140 Id. 
141 See Steven Prokesch, Regulators Agree on Rules to Prevent More B.C.C.I.’s, N.Y. Times, 
July 7, 1992, at D1. 
142Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 1. The 1990 Supplement to the Revised 
Concordat concerning “Information Flows Between Banking Supervisory Authorities” was 
not made part of the Minimum Standards. See id. at 1–2. 
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formation exchanges between regulators in different nations should 
continue.143
1. Consolidated Supervision Redux 
 The Minimum Standards stated that all international banks 
should be subject to consolidated supervision by their home country 
regulators.144 This required that the home country regulator receive 
reliable information on the global operations of the particular inter-
national bank.145 Supervisors then would assess this information in 
monitoring the safety and soundness of international banks.146 Under 
the Minimum Standards, home country bank regulators could pre-
vent the creation of corporate afªliations that undermined the appli-
cation of consolidated supervision or hindered effective regulation,147 
and also could prevent the opening of banking establishments in for-
eign jurisdictions if they were not satisªed with the host country su-
pervision.148
 Host country regulators likewise had the responsibility to ensure 
that the home country regulators had the ability to meet these stan-
dards.149 The Minimum Standards required that international banks 
receive permission from both home and host country regulators be-
fore opening cross-border banking establishments.150 The approval of 
any new banking establishment was contingent upon a multilateral 
agreement among regulators allowing each to gather the information 
necessary for effective supervision.151
 The Minimum Standards allocated supervisory responsibilities 
between home and host country regulators in a similar manner as the 
Revised Concordat, except in cases where the regulators decide that 
that allocation is inappropriate.152 If, in a particular situation, one 
                                                                                                                      
143 International Panel on Banking Revises Minimum Standards,Wall St. J., July 7, 1992, at 
C25. The Minimum Standards use the terms “home-country” and “host-country” in lieu of 
“parent” and “host.” See generally Minimum Standards, supra note 46. 
144 Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 3. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 See id. at 3-4. 
149. Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 2. 
150 Id. at 3. In determining whether to approve a foreign operation, the host-country 
regulator can consider the bank’s strength of capital, organization, and operating proce-
dures for risk management. The home-country regulator, of course, should consider the 
same factors. Id. at 4. 
151 Id. at 4–5. 
152 Id. 
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regulator determined that such allocation was inappropriate, then it 
could reach an explicit agreement with its counterpart on a more ap-
propriate allocation of supervisory responsibility.153 In the absence of 
an agreement to the contrary, the Minimum Standards continued to 
allocate supervisory responsibilities.154
 The host country regulator had responsibility for determining 
whether the international bank in fact would be subject to consoli-
dated supervision in the home country.155 If the host country regula-
tor found that the bank was not receiving effective supervision from 
the home country regulator, the host country regulator could prevent 
the opening of the new banking establishment.156 Alternatively, in its 
sole discretion, the host country regulator could allow the establish-
ment of branches subject to any regulatory restrictions it deemed 
necessary and appropriate,157 but then would have to supervise any 
such establishment on a “ ‘stand alone’ consolidated basis.”158
 In a statement accompanying the issuance of the Minimum Stan-
dards, the Committee stated, “the minimum standards are designed 
to provide greater assurances that in the future no international bank 
can operate without being subject to effective, consolidated supervi-
sion.”159 The Minimum Standards themselves made clear that con-
solidated supervision is a fundamental regulatory principle adopted 
by the international bank supervisory community.160
 The new standards required that a single bank regulator exercise 
primary regulatory authority over an international bank.161 The 
minimum standards make home country regulators the primary regu-
                                                                                                                      
153 See id. at 5. 
154 Id. at 5–6. 
155 See id. at 6. The host regulator should consider whether the bank is incorporated in 
a nation with which the host regulator has a mutual understanding for the exchange of 
information; whether the home-country regulator has given its consent for the new bank-
ing establishment; and whether the home-country regulator has the capability to perform 
consolidated supervision. Id. at 5–6. 
156 Id. This course of action is not necessary if the home-country regulators are willing 
and able to “initiate the effort to take measures to meet these standards.” Id. 
157 Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 6. 
158 Id. at 7. 
159 Maggie Fox, Watchdog Writes Standards to Stop BCCI-type Frauds, REUTER BUS. REP., 
July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File. 
160 Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 2. 
161 This prevents any sort of collegial regulatory arrangement, similar to the one that 
attempted to supervise BCCI for several years. Learning from BCCI, Fin. Times London, 
July 7, 1992, at 18. Speciªcally, the Minimum Standards state that all international banks 
“should be supervised by a home-country authority that capably performs consolidated 
supervision.” Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 3. 
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lator of the foreign banking operations of banks incorporated in their 
jurisdictions.162
 The most important change in the new standards was formaliza-
tion of the requirement that international banks receive permission 
from both home and host country regulators before opening foreign 
banking establishments.163 This double approval was designed to pre-
vent the ªnger-pointing that had occurred in the past after a bank 
failure.164
2. Gaps and Weaknesses in the Minimum Standards 
 Despite their improvements over past guidelines, the Minimum 
Standards contained a gap that banks could exploit to avoid regula-
tion. A host regulator could still choose to allow a foreign banking 
establishment to operate in its jurisdiction even if the establishment’s 
home regulator did not comply with the Minimum Standards.165 The 
host country regulator need only impose the restrictions it deemed 
“necessary and appropriate” on this establishment.166
 Further, the standards focused on the establishment of new 
branches and did not explicitly address existing branches.167 Without 
an explicit statement in the new standards, retroactive application of 
the standards could vary by nation.168
 The Minimum Standards were designed to promote cooperation 
between home and host countries and encourage the ºow of informa-
                                                                                                                      
162 Erik Ipsen, Central Bankers Unveil New Anti-Fraud Rules, Int’l Herald Trib., July 7, 
1992, at 9; see Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 3. 
163 See Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 4; Ipsen, supra note 162, at 9. 
164 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Prevent Fraud, Daily 
Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 30, at A-1 (1992). 
165 Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 6; see also Rod McNeil, Basel Group’s Bank 
Supervision Plan to Step Up International Coordination, Thomson’s Int’l Banking Reg., July 
13, 1992, at 1, 1–2 (summarizing this provision). 
166 Minimum Standards, supra note 46, at 6. The standards nevertheless require the 
host-country regulator to supervise the establishment adequately. See id. 
167 Three of the Minimum Standards’ four principles apply solely to the creation of a 
new banking establishment. See id. at 3–6. The ªrst principle (requiring adequate home-
country consolidated supervision) is phrased as “a condition for the creation and mainte-
nance of cross-border banking establishments” and arguably may apply to existing estab-
lishments. Id. at 3; see also Basle Committee on Banking Supervision Issues New Standards to Pre-
vent Fraud, supra note 164, at A-1 (quoting Mr. Corrigan of the Committee as saying that 
Minimum Standards “would ‘by implication at least’ be able to be applied to existing 
branches”). 
168 Learning from BCCI, supra note 161, at 18. This is expected to be a long and cumber-
some process. Id. 
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tion among bank regulators.169 The standards were purposely vague, 
however, in order to allow regulators the ºexibility to interpret them 
on a case-by-case basis.170
 Like the Concordat and the Revised Concordat, the Minimum 
Standards were not embodied in an enforceable treaty. The Commit-
tee, therefore, relied on regulators’ moral authority and informal 
pressure for enforcement. Furthermore, national regulators imple-
mented the standards in isolation from one another, causing discrep-
ancies in enforcement among nations.171 For instance, any penalties 
for violation of banking laws or regulations based on the standards 
rested with the individual country regulators. 
 Some critics argue that the Committee designed the Minimum 
Standards to prevent the development of large banks in emerging 
markets, and that banks in less developed nations would have the 
most difªculty meeting its requirements.172 While the Committee 
might have been concerned about emerging market banks operating 
in industrialized nations in the wake of BCCI,173 the Committee did 
not intend to limit the expansion of banks from emerging markets.174 
Rather, the Committee intended to respond more effectively to large 
international bank failures.175
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E. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
 The Basel Committee eventually developed more substantive 
standards for bank regulation. Rather than focusing merely on the 
coordination of international bank supervision, the Basel Committee 
provided comprehensive minimum standards for bank supervision 
when it published the Core Principles in 1997.176
 After 1992, several prominent bank failures occurred. In March 
1995, the venerable Barings Bank of London (“Barings”) failed after a 
trader in the Singapore operation, Nicholas Leeson, had lost over 927 
million British pounds (US$ 1.1 billion) in the futures market in Sin-
gapore.177 Leeson took advantage of his position as both a trader and 
manager of the settlements operation in Barings’ Singapore ofªce to 
hide his losses from his managers for several years.178 By the time 
these losses were discovered, they exceeded Barings’ capital. Despte 
intense negotiations, the Bank of England refused to support Barings, 
and the bank was put into receivership in February 1995 and subse-
quently sold to ING.179
 Later in 1995, the Federal Reserve Board revoked the charter of 
the New York branch of the Daiwa Bank (“Daiwa”) because of its con-
cealment of over US$ 1 billion in unrecorded trading losses incurred 
in the bond market.180 Daiwa had informed the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance of this information on August 8, 1995.181 The Ministry of Fi-
nance, however, delayed communicating the information to the Fed-
eral Reserve Board until September 18, 1995.182 The Federal Reserve 
promptly issued an order under the Foreign Bank Supervision En-
hancement Act closing the Daiwa branch, which wound up its U.S. 
operations on February 2, 1996.183 The Daiwa closing preceded a 
1997 ªnancial crisis that spread across Asia and resulted in the closure 
                                                                                                                      
176 See Core Principles, supra note 15, at 2. 
177 Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalization of Financial Risks and Interna-
tional Supervision of Banks and Securities Firms: Lessons from the Barings Debacle, 30 Int’l Law. 
301, 309 (1996). 
178 See id. at 307–09. 
179 See id. at 323. 
180 Kristin Leigh Case, The Daiwa Wake-Up Call: The Need for Standards for Banking Super-
vision, 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 215, 215–16 (1996). 
181 Id. at 216. 
182 Id. at 217. 
183 Id. at 215. 
2005] Enforceable International Financial Standards 261 
of many banks and the dramatic decrease in the gross national prod-
ucts of nations such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.184
 During this volatile period, the ªnance ministers and bank regu-
lators of the G-7 were becoming uneasy about the stability of the in-
ternational ªnancial system. At the 1996 G-7 summit in Lyon, France, 
the leaders (through the Summit Communiqué) requested standard-
setting bodies, including the Basel Committee, to draft more com-
prehensive and detailed ªnancial standards.185 The leaders stated in 
the communiqué that: 
[they] welcome the work accomplished by the international 
bodies concerned with banking and securities regulation . . . 
[and o]ver the year ahead, [authorities] should seek to make 
maximum progress on . . . encouraging the adoption of 
strong prudential standards in emerging economies and in-
creasing cooperation with their supervisory authorities; in-
ternational ªnancial institutions and bodies should increase 
their efforts to promote effective supervisory structures in 
these economies.186
The Basel Committee responded to this call by issuing the Core Prin-
ciples in September 1997, slightly over one year after the G-7’s re-
quest.187
 The Core Principles set forth broad guidelines on best practices 
for bank supervision.188 The document does not merely deal with the 
coordination of supervision of internationally active banks. Instead, it 
details twenty-four guidelines for supervising entire national banking 
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systems from the licensing of banks to their closure due to insolvency. 
Only three of the twenty-ªve principles deal with cross-border bank-
ing, which previously had been the focus of the Basel Committee’s 
standard-setting work.189 The remainder set forth guidelines for the 
supervision of banks, even those without international operations. 
This document represented a major expansion of the Basel Commit-
tee’s work on bank supervision. 
 The twenty-ªve principles are divided into seven subject catego-
ries: preconditions for effective banking supervision (Principle 1), 
licensing and structure (Principles 2–5), prudential regulations and 
requirements (Principles 6–15), methods of ongoing banking super-
vision (Principles 16–20), information requirements (Principle 21), 
formal powers of supervisors (Principle 22) and cross-border banking 
(Principles 23–25).190 Although a detailed analysis of each principle is 
beyond the scope of this Article, a summary of some of the key provi-
sions is relevant. 
 First, the Core Principles state that there are certain economic 
conditions necessary for an effective bank supervisory system. A na-
tion must have sound macroeconomic policies, effective market disci-
pline, a well-developed legal system, sound accounting principles, an 
orderly method for closing insolvent banks, and policies that promote 
ªnancial system stability such as lender of last resort responsibility and 
depositor protection.191 Although bank supervisors generally do not 
create or implement these policies, sound macroeconomic conditions 
are vital to their ability to regulate banks effectively. 
 The Core Principles stress the need for the independence of 
bank supervisors, a sentiment echoed by several commentators.192 
Supervisors require adequate resources both with respect to the 
number of staff and the independent, consistent funding to perform 
their jobs.193 Effective supervisory systems will “have clear responsibili-
ties and objectives for each agency” involved in supervising banks.194
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 Unfortunately, many countries’ ªnancial sector supervisors still 
do not enjoy adequate independence. For example, recent banking 
crises have involved connected lending between banks and their own-
ers or related parties at favorable interest rates.195 Some of these bor-
rowers used their political inºuence to prevent bank supervisors from 
forbidding or even questioning these loans.196 In a recent IMF survey 
of the bank systems, 45% of regulators in emerging markets were not 
operationally independent or lacked independent funding.197
 The language of the Core Principles sets forth the best practices of 
bank supervision in broad terms. For instance, the Core Principles state 
that supervisors should set “limits to restrict bank exposures to single 
borrowers” or “groups of related borrowers.”198 In the comments to the 
Core Principles, the drafters indicate that 25% of capital should be the 
maximum limit of a bank’s exposure to a single borrower,199 but this is 
not an absolute limit.200 Similarly, the Core Principles state that super-
visors must ensure that banks “have adequate policies, practices and 
procedures, including strict ‘know-your-customer’ rules, that promote 
high ethical and professional standards.”201 The Core Principles do not 
speciªcally deªne such rules, other than referring to the more detailed 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering recommenda-
tions.202 This vagueness of language was necessary for the various Basel 
Committee members to reach agreement on the Core Principles, and 
to encourage several regional groups of bank supervisors to endorse 
them.203
 In addition to the members of the Basel Committee, bank super-
visory agencies from non-G-10 nations endorsed the Core Princi-
ples.204 Representatives from Chile, the People’s Republic of China, 
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the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, Russia, and Thailand par-
ticipated in the drafting process, while ofªcials from Argentina, Bra-
zil, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Po-
land, and Singapore participated closely in the Core Principles’ 
development.205 The Core Principles thus represented one of the ªrst 
major Basel Committee projects that involved signiªcant participation 
by non-G-10 nations at the drafting stage. This addressed the recur-
ring criticism that the Basel Committee was exclusively a “rich coun-
tries” club.206
 Besides direct participation during the drafting process, a 
signiªcant number of nations endorsed the Core Principles after they 
were issued. At the October 1997 annual meeting of the International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (“World Bank”), the Core Principles were en-
dorsed by the attending nations.207 The Group of 22 endorsed the 
Core Principles, along with other international ªnancial standards, in 
an October 1998 report.208 In the same month, the International 
Conference of Banking Supervisors endorsed the Core Principles and 
pledged to implement them during their biennial conference.209
 As nations began to implement the Core Principles, it became 
clear that bank supervisors needed additional guidance and explana-
tion. In order to provide such guidance, the Basel Committee issued 
the Core Principles Methodology (“Methodology”) in 1998.210 As the 
Committee noted, “[e]xperience has already shown that the Princi-
ples may be interpreted in widely diverging ways, and incorrect inter-
pretations may result in inconsistencies among assessments.”211 The 
Methodology restated the language of each of the twenty-ªve princi-
ples, and then went on to describe criteria to be used in assessing 
whether a particular nation has effectively implemented that princi-
ple. The criteria were divided into two groups: (1) essential criteria 
that are the minimum level of implementation needed for compli-
ance, and (2) additional criteria that represent the best practice of 
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implementation.212 Because of its detail, the Methodology has be-
come the more inºuential and useful document among bank supervi-
sors. 
F. Gaps in the Core Principles 
 Despite its breadth and speciªcity compared to other Basel 
Committee documents, the Core Principles did not address some im-
portant issues in the bank supervisory system. First, they did not 
speciªcally address whether a country should have a deposit insur-
ance scheme.213 Although, the Core Principles discuss a systemic 
safety net as a precondition to effective supervision, they do not in-
clude a speciªc requirement for deposit insurance.214 The Annex to 
the Core Principles addresses this issue, and makes no recommenda-
tion regarding deposit insurance.215 It merely highlights the possibil-
ity that deposit insurance increases the “risk of imprudent behav-
iour”216 by banks and stresses that any deposit insurance program 
“should be tailored to the circumstances in, as well as historical and 
cultural features of, each country.”217
 Furthermore, the Basel Committee did not make any recom-
mendation regarding the best organizational structure for bank su-
pervision. Numerous commentators and policymakers, however, have 
already dealt with this issue.218 For instance, one study considered 
whether there should be a single ªnancial sector regulator similar to 
the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom.219 Another 
discussed whether bank supervisory functions should be part of the 
central bank, which has lender of last resort responsibility, or whether 
they should be separated to avoid any potential conºict of interest.220 
Australia adopted a “four peaks” approach, allocating regulatory re-
sponsibility to each agency by objective: ªnancial stability, prudential 
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supervision, consumer protection, and competition.221 Since com-
mentators and inºuential policymakers have not agreed on a best 
structure, it is not surprising that the Basel Committee did not make 
any recommendation on this topic.222
 Nor could the Basel Committee agree on common bank account-
ing standards. Principle 21 of the Core Principles recognizes the im-
portance of proper ªnancial reporting that reºects the operations of 
banks in a fair, consistent manner.223 Furthermore, some commonal-
ity of accounting methods among nations is necessary for effective 
consolidated supervision of international banks, because differing 
accounting standards make monitoring banks’ ªnancial operations in 
different nations difªcult.224 Nevertheless, the Basel Committee was 
unable to agree on substantive rules for accounting standards.225 It 
appears that more substantive harmonization of bank accounting 
standards will be left for a future revision of the Core Principles. 
 With the issuance of the Revised Capital Accord, however, the Basel 
Committee has resources available to focus on revising the Core Princi-
ples. In any such revision, the Basel Committee should strengthen the 
principle on bank accounting standards. While the Committee has 
commented regularly on the work of the International Accounting 
Standards Board and the International Auditing and Assurance Stan-
dards Board,226 the Committee still must provide further detail on such 
standards in order to improve the compatability of bank ªnancial re-
ports among nations.227
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G. Revised Capital Accord 
 As noted above, the Basel Committee issued another major in-
ternational ªnancial standard relevant to the Core Principles—the 
Revised Capital Accord.228 This complex document sets forth various 
methods whereby internationally active banks can calculate a bank’s 
minimum required capital.229 Although a detailed analysis of this 
document is beyond the scope of this Article, certain provisions are 
relevant to this discussion because they may create an incentive for 
nations to implement the Core Principles.230
 The Revised Capital Accord consists of three policy objectives or 
“pillars.”231 The ªrst pillar describes the two principal methods avail-
able for calculating minimum capital levels for banks: the standard-
ized approach that establishes categories for different types of risk, 
and the internal ratings-based approach that allows banks to use their 
own internal risk valuation method.232 The theory underlying risk 
valuation is that a particular bank asset or loan will be evaluated for 
risk, and a particular weight will be applied to that asset in order to 
calculate the total risk-weighted assets of the bank.233
 The original Capital Accord provided a very simple method of cal-
culating minimum capital using risk weight categories.234 Loans to 
countries who are OECD members received a risk weight of 20%; loans 
to nations outside of the OECD received a risk weight of 100%.235 This 
meant that banks could allocate less capital to loans to OECD govern-
ments or banks incorporated in OECD countries. The Revised Capital 
Accord provides for a much more sophisticated and complicated 
method. 
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 The second pillar of the Revised Capital Accord refers to the 
prudential supervision of the risk valuation method chosen.236 In the 
prior Capital Accord, only one method of calculating minimum capi-
tal was available.237 In the Revised Capital Accord, two principal 
methods are available.238 Bank supervisors must understand and ap-
prove the method selected by each particular bank.239
 The third pillar calls for using market discipline to enforce the Re-
vised Capital Accord.240 The Basel Committee recommends that banks 
disclose both their valuation method in general terms and their capital 
levels to depositors and the general public.241 The market can then 
evaluate the method chosen and the amount of capital retained by the 
bank and reºect any risk in the stock price of the particular bank.242
 The changes to the formula for calculating minimum capital, par-
ticularly the standardised approach in Pillar I, are relevant to this dis-
cussion. In determining the risk weight for credits to sovereign and 
corporate borrowers, banks can refer to external credit assessments 
from rating agencies243 such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch, or 
ratings from export credit insurance agencies.244 These agencies and 
their analysts take compliance with the Core Principles and other in-
ternational ªnancial standards into account when determining each 
country’s sovereign credit rating.245 Countries that comply with inter-
national ªnancial standards, such as the Core Principles, tend to re-
ceive more favorable sovereign credit ratings.246 A favorable credit rat-
ing places a country in a lower risk weight category.247 Therefore, 
countries that comply with international ªnancial standards, and the 
banks located therein, will beneªt from lower interest rates on loans, 
because banks will be able to allocate less capital to a loan placed in a 
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lower risk weight category. A more detailed discussion of the effects of 
the Revised Capital Accord on enforceability of the Core Principles fol-
lows. 
II. Implementation 
 As mentioned above, the Core Principles are a statement of best 
practices expressed as guidelines. Like other Basel Committee docu-
ments, they do not have the force of law and must be implemented at 
the national level. As such, implementation of the Core Principles has 
varied signiªcantly by nation. While most developing nations have 
implemented the Core Principles to a large extent, emerging markets 
and transition economies have only done so to a more limited de-
gree.248 This section highlights the implementation of the Core Prin-
ciples in selected important ªnancial markets: the European Union, 
the United Kingdom, France, Hong Kong, and the United States. 
A. European Union 
 Among the objectives of the European Union (“EU”) are the 
creation of an internal market and the dismantling of internal trade 
restrictions.249 The creation of this internal market for ªnancial ser-
vices has been more difªcult and problematic than for manufactured 
goods. In the 1998 European Council meeting in Vienna, the leaders 
of the EU called for the prompt integration of the ªnancial services 
sector among member nations.250 Subsequently, the European Com-
mission proposed a Financial Services Action Plan that outlined the 
steps (including forty-two legislative measures) to complete the crea-
tion of an internal market for ªnancial services.251 As of June 2004, 
nearly all the required legislation at the EU level had been enacted.252 
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Nevertheless, member nations have yet to enact legislation at the na-
tional level to implement the various EU directives.253 Certain Finan-
cial Services Action Plan directives are related to the Core Principles, 
including the Regulation on the Application of International Ac-
counting Standards254 and the Directive on Supplementary Supervi-
sion of Credit Institutions.255
 The supervision of banks within the EU is primarily the responsi-
bility of member states and is not conducted at the EU level.256 The 
European Central Bank (“ECB”) along with the European System of 
Central Banks (“ESCB”) controls monetary policy for the member 
states that are part of the European Monetary Union.257 The ECB does 
not, however, have direct responsibility for the supervision of banks 
within the EU. Under the Treaty on European Union (“Treaty”), the 
ECB can only aid in the smooth operation of prudential supervision of 
banks.258 The Treaty does contain a special provision allowing the ECB 
to assume prudential supervision over banks, but this authority requires 
a unanimous approval from Member States that would be nearly im-
possible to obtain.259 The proposed constitutional treaty does not 
change this structure.260 Overall, banking law at the EU level currently 
has little substantive inºuence on bank supervision within the EU. Most 
bank supervisory practice is provided for in the national law of the 
Member States. 
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 Nevertheless, the EU is in the midst of restructuring its ªnancial 
regulatory agencies in order to further integrate the ªnancial services 
sector within the EU. As part of the Financial Services Action Plan, 
the European Commission asked a group of prominent politicians 
involved in monetary and economic affairs (“Committe of Wise 
Men”) to report on improving the regulation of the securities markets 
in the EU.261 Led by Alexandre Lamfalussy, the Committee of Wise 
Men issued a report (“Report of the Wise Men”) recommending 
changes in the enactment of legislation governing the securities mar-
kets in Europe.262 The Report of the Wise Men developed a new legis-
lative process (“Lamfalussy Process”), originally intended for the secu-
rities markets, that the European Commission has recommended be 
extended to the other parts of the ªnancial services sector—namely, 
banking and insurance.263 The European Council and the European 
Parliament have in turn agreed on a Directive that applies the Lamfa-
lussy Process to the banking and insurance sectors.264
 The Lamfalussy Process creates four levels of lawmaking to im-
plement policy and enact laws governing the ªnancial services sec-
tor.265 A weakness of the current EU legislative procedure is the 
amount of time required to enact legislation after it has been pro-
posed by the European Commission, especially when using the pre-
dominant method of enacting EU legislation, the codecision proce-
dure.266 A period of two to two and a half years is not uncommon for 
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enacting legislation.267 Level I of the Lamfalussy Process involves the 
adoption of directives and regulations using the codecision procedure 
at the EU level.268 Level II involves the implementation of the law by 
providing additional details.269 This level is analogous to the rulemak-
ing by U.S. administrative agencies such as the Comptroller of the 
Currency or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The Report 
of the Wise Men recommended that a special committee of national 
supervisory ofªcials be created to develop these details.270 Level III 
refers to greater cooperation among national supervisors to “ensure 
consistent enforcement and implementation.”271 As with Level II, the 
Report of the Wise Men recommended the creation of a committee to 
coordinate supervisory practice among EU member states.272 Level IV 
refers to more effective enforcement of EU laws.273
 Level II and Level III are being implemented by committees estab-
lished by the European Commission. The European Commission has 
created the European Banking Committee (formerly the Banking Advi-
sory Committee) as a Level II committee.274 In addition, in January 
2004, the Council created the Committee of European Banking Super-
visors as a Level III committee.275 This committee will coordinate bank 
supervisory practices so as to create a level playing ªeld for banks 
within the EU.276 These committees are so new that there is little basis 
upon which to evaluate their effectiveness. The EU is clearly attempting 
to centralize banking supervision as much as possible within the legal 
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limits of the treaty.277 A clear trend within EU law on ªnancial services 
is the increased centralization of bank regulation within the EU. Never-
theless, although the EU is moving towards more involvement in bank 
and ªnancial services supervision and regulation, most supervision of 
banks operating within the EU still occurs at the national level. 
B. United Kingdom 
 The United Kingdom is not part of the European Monetary Un-
ion and has maintained its own independent currency, the pound 
sterling. In 2000, the British Parliament radically reorganized the 
agencies supervising and regulating the ªnancial services sector by 
enacting the Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000.278 Nine sepa-
rate agencies that regulated the securities, banking, and insurance 
sectors were merged into one regulatory agency—the Financial Ser-
vices Authority (“FSA”).279 The Bank of England continues to be re-
sponsible for monetary policy and serves as the lender of last resort, 
but its supervisory function has been wholly transferred to the FSA.280 
The failures of BCCI and Barings hurt the credibility of the Bank of 
England as a supervisor and prompted Parliament, at least in part, to 
strip the Bank of England of its supervisory function. 
 The United Kingdom has an active, well-developed ªnancial sec-
tor and is particularly strong in international ªnance.281 Its stock mar-
ket is the third largest in the world in terms of market capitaliza-
tion.282 The bank supervisory system in the United Kingdom is 
similarly well-developed and sophisticated, as conªrmed by the IMF. 
In 2003, the IMF evaluated the soundness and stability of the United 
Kingdom’s ªnancial system as part of its Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (“FSAP”).283 Under the FSAP, the IMF sends an inspection 
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team of ªnancial regulators to evaluate and critique each country’s 
ªnancial system, with the aim of improving the soundness of each 
country’s ªnancial system and enhancing the stability of the interna-
tional ªnancial system as a whole.284 As part of this assessment, the 
inspection team also evaluates the implementation of key ªnancial 
standards, including the Core Principles.285
 The 2003 FSAP report concluded that the supervisory system in 
the United Kingdom is state of the art and fully complies with the 
Core Principles.286 The report determined that the FSA had clear 
regulatory objectives, was independent, and was separately funded by 
industry assessments.287 Thus, the FSA structure met the independ-
ence requirement of Principle 1 of the Core Principles.288 The FSA 
controlled licensing of banks, and British law limited use of the term 
“bank.”289 Likewise, the FSA had the legal authority to approve the 
transfer of control of ªnancial institutions.290
 The report did, however, make some minor recommendations. 
Adequate staff resources are part of the independence requirement 
of the Core Principles.291 The inspection team, however, noted that 
there were relatively few bank supervisory personnel in the FSA,292 
and the staff available to supervise the market operations of banks was 
thin compared to those supervising securities ªrms.293 Also, the re-
port recommended additional reporting by banks to the FSA, in par-
ticular, reports on nonperforming loans, capital adequacy, and other 
supervisory ªnancial ratios.294 The FSA, in its reply to the Assessment 
Report, generally agreed with the conclusions, but noted that, in its 
opinion, current supervisory practices met the concerns expressed in 
the report.295
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 Overall, the United Kingdom is in full compliance with the Core 
Principles. The FSAP assessment report only raised some minor issues 
involving reporting and adequate stafªng, neither of which rose to a 
level of non-compliance. In addition, an independent, non-proªt, 
standards–monitoring organization has rated the United Kingdom 
second in the world with respect to compliance with twelve key stan-
dards, including the Core Principles.296
C. France 
 Unlike the United Kingdom, France has chosen a sector-based 
regulatory scheme with separate agencies supervising banking, securi-
ties, and insurance.297 The banking system in France is regulated by 
three separate governmental agencies: le Comité des Etablissements de 
Credit et des Enterprises d’Investissement (“CECEI”), the Commission 
Bancaire (“Commission”), and the ministre chargée de l’Economie et 
des Finances (the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry).298 Be-
fore August 2003, an independent agency, la Comité de la Réglementa-
tion Bancaire et Financière, regulated bank competition, but the law 
enacted in August 2003 transferred its powers to the Ministry of Fi-
nance.299 The Bank of France (la Banque de France) governs monetary 
policy in a manner similar to that of the Bank of England and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board in the United States. The CECEI primarily adminis-
ters the licensing of banks and the authorization of foreign banking 
establishments to operate in France.300 The Commission is the primary 
agency responsible for bank supervision in France.301
 The Commission is composed of six members and is chaired by 
the Governor of the Bank of France.302 The Director of the Treasury 
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is a member of the Commission.303 There are four other members 
nominated by the Ministry of the Economy, Finance, and Industry, 
one of whom is generally an advisor to the Conseil d’état and another 
is an advisor to the Cours de Cassation.304 The other two members are 
selected based on their expertise in monetary and banking law.305 
These four nominated members serve terms of six years.306 The 
Commission supervises credit institutions for ªnancial soundness and 
compliance with banking law.307 The Commission has extensive en-
forcement powers, from the imposition of ªnes to the mandatory liq-
uidation and closure of banks.308 The Commission relies to a certain 
degree on personnel of the Bank of France, or outside auditors, to 
conduct bank inspections.309
 The IMF conducted an FSAP assessment of France during 
2004.310 The assessment report issued to the public in November 2004 
found that France generally complied with international standards 
and conªrmed its “ªnancial sector is strong and well-supervised.”311 
The report did note, however, that France should strengthen the co-
operation among various regulatory agencies and monitor the poten-
tially risky expansions of certain French banks into both ªnancial and 
non-ªnancial enterprises.312 Currently, banks may acquire non-
ªnancial enterprises without the approval of CECEI.313 The FSA rec-
ommended that the CECEI be granted the power to supervise any 
expansion into non-ªnancial industries.314 The report also criticized 
the administrative intervention of the French government into the 
banking market, particularly the setting of the deposit interest rates 
and the maximum interest rate on loans.315
 The FSAP assessment also indicated that, given the institutional 
structure of the French bank regulatory agencies, the independence 
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of the bank supervisor is questionable. The Bank of France and the 
Treasury have permanent seats on the Commission Bancaire and the 
other members are appointed by the Ministry of the Economy.316 
While the members do have ªxed terms, the executive branch has 
extensive control over the membership of the Commission.317 In addi-
tion, the Commission relies to a signiªcant degree on personnel over 
whose activities the Commission has no direct control.318 Further-
more, Bank representatives serve on the board of the CECEI, creating 
potential conºicts of interest.319 These factors detract from the inde-
pendence of the bank regulator as compared to Great Britain. Princi-
ple 1 of the Core Principles refers to the independence of the regula-
tor, both operationally and with respect to funding and adequate 
stafªng levels.320
 Overall, France is in compliance with the Core Principles, though 
the independence of the regulator may be weaker than in other G-7 
nations. An independent assessment group has ranked France nine-
teenth in the world with respect to compliance with international 
ªnancial standards.321
D. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“SAR”) is a ma-
jor global ªnancial center. Its stock market is ranked ªfth by market 
capitalization in the world and nearly every major international bank 
maintains an ofªce in Hong Kong.322 Although Hong Kong had been 
a British colony since the 19th century and ruled by a governor ap-
pointed by the British crown,323 sovereignty over Hong Kong was 
transferred by Great Britain to the People’s Republic of China in 
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1997.324 The fundamental legal document now governing Hong Kong 
is the Basic Law.325 The Legislative Council in Hong Kong enacts laws 
with the approval of the Chief Executive, including the Banking Or-
dinance that governs the structure of the bank regulatory agencies 
and provides for the supervision of banks.326
 Banks dominate the credit markets in Hong Kong. The three 
largest banks account for 57% of deposits.327 The banking market 
takes on an oligopolistic character and, until 2000, operated like a 
cartel.328 Deposit interest rate setting by the larger banks was phased 
out in 2001.329
 Regulation of the ªnancial services market in Hong Kong is or-
ganized by traditional sectors—banking, insurance, and securities.330 
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) is the principal su-
pervisor of banks in Hong Kong, as well as those organized or operat-
ing therein.331 In addition, the HKMA implements monetary policy 
and supervises the payment and settlements system.332
 In 2002, the IMF conducted an FSAP inspection of Hong Kong.333 
The report concluded that Hong Kong’s ªnancial system is “resilient, 
sound and overseen by a comprehensive supervisory framework.”334 
Hong Kong bank supervisors were adequately ªnanced and had ap-
propriate enforcement powers to comply with the Core Principles.335 
No bank failures occured in Hong Kong from 1993 through 2003.336
 According to the assessment report, the primary weakness of the 
bank supervisory structure in Hong Kong is the lack of independence 
of the HKMA.337 The procedures for appointment, compensation, 
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dismissal, and terms of ofªce of the senior HKMA ofªcials are not ex-
plicit and need to be so.338 In addition, current legislation does not 
delineate the HKMA’s regulatory and supervisory responsibilities, nor 
its monetary policy objectives.339
 Good bank supervisory governance is characterized by inde-
pendence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. According to 
the FSAP assessment, Hong Kong’s banking regime needs improve-
ment with respect to the ªrst three.340 The Financial Secretary ap-
points the head of the HKMA.341 The “procedures for appointment, 
terms of ofªce, and grounds for dismissal” of the head of the HKMA 
are not explicitly provided in legislation.342 The Financial Secretary 
can exempt persons from the Banking Ordinance without limita-
tion.343 HKMA lacks a board that oversees its regular operations.344 
Any appeal of a supervisory order issued by the HKMA goes to the 
Chief Executive of the SAR, a political ofªcial.345
 Articles 109 and 110 of the Basic Law vest responsibility for 
ªnancial market supervision in the government.346 The executive 
branch is predominant in the Hong Kong government, and the Chief 
Executive has a reserve power to direct statutory bodies, including the 
HKMA, to take certain actions.347 There are few publicly disclosed 
limits on this reserve power.348 The Chief Executive could, for in-
stance, direct the HKMA to issue a banking license or forbid them 
from revoking a banking license. Section 11 of the Securities and Fu-
tures Ordinance, which regulates the securities market, sets condi-
tions on the use of this reserve power in the context of securities regu-
lation.349 The FSAP assessment team recommended that similar limits 
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be placed on the use of the reserve power by the Chief Executive in 
the bank regulatory arena.350
 Thus, Hong Kong’s primary deªciency in complying with the 
Core Principles is the HKMA’s lack of independence. The Chief Ex-
ecutive of the SAR can intervene in any matter under the Banking 
Ordinance.351 While the Chief Executive has never used this reserve 
power, its “presence poses a potential threat to supervisory independ-
ence”352 and raises the serious possibility of government interference 
into bank supervisory matters. Such concerns are particularly relevent 
in light of recent outcries over sedition laws proposed by the govern-
ment, as well as other perceived abuses of power.353
 The HKMA vehemently disagreed with the FSAP Report’s analysis 
of regulatory independence.354 The HKMA argues that the Chief Ex-
ecutive has never used the reserve power and will only use it as a last 
resort.355 The restraint on this power is “deeply embedded,” and any 
abuse of the power would be “politically untenable.”356 This response, 
however, was written prior to the recent introduction of the sedition 
law by the Hong Kong government and the subsequent mass protests 
against the Hong Kong government’s perceived abuse of power.357
 The FSAP report also noted that regulatory arrangements re-
garding the ªnancial system are “strongly reliant on personal relation-
ships and understanding at the level of agency heads and the gov-
ernment.”358 In order to clarify such arrangements, the relevant 
agencies should issue a clear statement of policy regarding their rela-
tionship in times of ªnancial stress, as well as a public disclosure of 
the speciªc roles of the various regulatory agencies.359
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 Regarding ªnancial system stability, Hong Kong currently has no 
deposit insurance scheme.360 While a deposit insurance scheme is not 
a requirement under the Core Principles, it is listed as a technique or 
tool to enhance ªnancial system stability.361 A bill establishing a de-
posit insurance system was enacted by the Legislative Council with a 
plan to commence operations in 2006.362
 Overall, Hong Kong is in compliance with the Core Principles, 
although substantial issues have been raised with respect to the inde-
pendence, accountability, and transparecy of its banking regulation 
system. An observer of the compliance of international standards 
ranks Hong Kong sixth in the world.363
E. United States 
 The United States has the largest ªnancial services market in the 
world.364 The complex structure of bank regulation in the United 
States matches the complexity and size of its ªnancial services market. 
The hallmark of the U.S. banking system is its dual nature; banks can 
be chartered either by individual states or by the U.S. government.365 
While this dual banking system creates a complex licensing and su-
pervisory system, it is unlikely to change. In recent years, the U.S. 
Congress has concentrated regulatory authority over foreign bank 
operations and complex ªnancial organizations at the national level 
with the Federal Reserve System.366
 At the federal level, there are three primary bank supervisors in 
the United States: the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors 
(“Federal Reserve”), the Ofªce of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).367 
The Federal Reserve governs monetary policy and supervises certain 
institutions within the U.S. banking system—members of the Federal 
Reserve system, ªnancial holding companies, and foreign banks operat-
ing in the United States.368 Each of the Governors of the Federal Re-
                                                                                                                      
360 HK FSAP Report, supra note 322, at 39. 
361 Core Principles, supra note 15, at 46. 
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366 Schooner, supra note 280, at 411–12. 
367 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (2004). 
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serve, including the Chairman, are appointed by the President of the 
United States for fourteen year terms, subject to conªrmation by the 
U.S. Senate.369
 The Comptroller of the Currency supervises national banks.370 
National banks are credit institutions that have sought a federal charter 
under the National Bank Act, rather than a banking license from a par-
ticular state.371 The Comptroller of the Currency is appointed by the 
President for a ªve year term and conªrmed by the U.S. Senate.372 The 
OCC, part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, issues regulations 
on the permissible activities of national banks, conducts on-site and off-
site inspections, and has comprehensive enforcement authority.373
 The FDIC provides deposit insurance to member banks, for 
which they pay an insurance premium.374 The FDIC also issues regula-
tions governing the activities of member banks, both federally and 
state-chartered, and has comprehensive enforcement powers over its 
members.375 The FDIC is governed by a ªve member board, one of 
whom is the Comptroller of the Currency, one of whom is the Direc-
tor of the Ofªce of Thrift Supervision, and the other three of whom 
are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.376 The 
appointed directors of the Board serve six year terms. The Chairman 
of the FDIC is chosen from these three appointed directors and serves 
a ªve year term.377
 Other types of ªnancial institutions are supervised by separate 
regulatory agencies. The National Credit Union Association super-
vises credit unions,378 and the Ofªce of Thrift Supervision supervises 
savings and loan associations.379
 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act represented a major revision of 
ªnancial services law.380 This act removed the prohibition against the 
conduct of commercial lending and investment banking activities 
within the same ªnancial enterprise, a prohibition imposed by the 
                                                                                                                      
369 12 U.S.C. §  241. 
370 Id. § 26. 
371 National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 21–43 (2004). 
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374 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1815. 
375 12 U.S.C.A. § 1819. 
376 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1). 
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2005] Enforceable International Financial Standards 283 
Glass-Steagall Act following the Great Depression.381 In addition, the 
act made the Federal Reserve the umbrella regulator for ªnancial 
holding companies, a new designation for complex ªnancial services 
organizations.382
 The IMF has not yet conducted an FSAP assessment of the 
United States. However, the U.S. Department of the Treasury con-
ducted a self-assessment of U.S. compliance with the Core Principles 
in 1998.383 The self-assessment concluded that the United States gen-
erally complies with the Core Principles.384 The bank regulatory agen-
cies are independent and have sufªcient staff resources and fund-
ing.385 The supervisors have the authority to issue licenses and 
sufªcient enforcement authority, from issuing ªnes to ordering the 
closure of banks.386 The various regulatory agencies have issued ap-
propriate regulations on capital adequacy and loan exposure.387
 The only weakness highlighted in the self-assessment was the lack 
of mandatory “know-your-customer” rules to discourage the use of the 
banking system for money laundering or criminal activity.388 Since the 
issuance of the self-assessment, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
has issued regulations requiring banks to institute a Customer 
Identiªcation Program.389 These regulations meet the requirement of 
“know-your-customer-rules” set forth in Principle 15 of the Core Princi-
ples.390
 Overall, the United States is compliant with the Core Principles. 
According to its own self-assessment, it has fully implemented the 
Core Principles.391 Furthermore, an independent observer has 
                                                                                                                      
381 12 U.S.C. § 6805 (repealing 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377). 
382 Id. § 103; see also Joseph J. Norton and Christopher D. Olive, A By-product of the 
Globalization Process: The Rise of Cross-Border Bank Mergers and Acquisitons: The U.S. Regulatory 
Framework, 56 Bus. Law. 591, 623–32 (2001) (discussing the effect of the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act). 
383 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Self-assessment Report on Core Principles 
(1998), available at http://www.treas.gov/ofªces/international-affairs/standards/code10. 
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questionnaire on implementation of the Core Principles sent out by the Basel Committee. 
See Core Principles Methodology, supra note 16, at 4. 
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385 Id. at 3. 
386 Id. at 10–12. 
387 See id. at 16–19. 
388 Id. at 35. 
389 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2004). 
390 Core Principles, supra note 15, at 6. 
391 See supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
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ranked the United States ªrst in the world for compliance with inter-
national ªnancial standards, including the Core Principles.392
F. Emerging Markets 
 Implementation of the Core Principles by emerging markets has 
been more problematic. Generally, the industrialized nations and, in 
particular, those represented on the Basel Committee, comply with 
the Core Principles. As seen by recent bank failures, however, this 
does not mean that the ªnancial systems of the industrialized nations 
are not risk-free.393 According to one source, nearly 70% of nations 
do not adhere to the principle of consolidated supervision in regulat-
ing banks, and approximately 45% do not have an independent bank 
regulator.394 Offshore ªnancial centers have been of particular con-
cern. In fact, the IMF, in conducting the FSAP, has given priority to 
assessing forty-four offshore ªnancial centers.395 As of March 2004, 
the IMF has completed its assessment of forty-two of these forty-
four.396 Compliance with international ªnancial standards among 
these offshore ªnancial centers tended to increase with income per 
capita.397 According to the IMF, about 40% of the offshore ªnancial 
centers need to strengthen the bank supervisors’ independence, the 
supervisors’ available resources, and their ability to conduct onsite 
and offsite examinations of banks.398
III. Enforcement of the Core Principles 
 As discussed above, the Core Principles, like nearly all interna-
tional ªnancial standards, are “soft law.”399 They are not treaties en-
                                                                                                                      
392 EStandards Forum Weekly Report, supra note 296, at 11. 
393 See, e.g., Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, The Ongoing Process of International 
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394 Agustin Carstens, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Opportunity for Emerging and 
Developing Countries in International Standard Setting: An IMF Perspective, Address 
Before the Fourth Annual IMF/World Bank/Federal Reserve Seminar ( June 2, 2004), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2004/060204a.htm. 
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http://www.imf.org. 
396 Id. at 6. 
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forceable under international law. The members of the Basel Com-
mittee did not intend to create a treaty and did not negotiate the 
Core Principles as a treaty. 
 Developing international ªnancial standards as soft law has some 
advantages. This type of law is ºexible and allows the parties to con-
sider speciªc national conditions or attributes in implementing the 
standards. For instance, the Core Principles are sensitive to the fact 
that bank regulatory structures differ greatly among nations. The 
United Kingdom has a single regulator—the Financial Services Au-
thority—for the entire ªnancial sector.400 The United States has sev-
eral bank regulators at the federal level—the Federal Reserve, the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC—and numerous bank 
regulators at the state level.401 The Core Principles do not require a 
speciªc regulatory structure for compliance. They allow nations to 
maintain their current structure as long as certain underlying princi-
ples, such as independence of the regulator, adequate funding, and 
adequate stafªng, are met.402 As a practical matter, requiring a 
speciªc regulatory structure would be virtually impossible because the 
reorganization of regulatory agencies typically requires legislation 
that likely is not within the power of bank regulators alone.403
 Another advantage that non-binding standards provide is the 
relative ease with which countries reach agreement on them. The na-
tions recognize the non-binding nature of the agreement and thus 
tend to be more inclined to accept their substantive standards. 
 Finally, soft law is particularly effective in industries characterized 
by rapid change, such as the ªnancial services sector, where im-
provements in technology and communications allow for new 
ªnancial products and new methods of delivering ªnancial services. 
 Nevertheless, soft law also has its disadvantages. This type of law is 
not directly enforceable by a court or any other judicial authority or 
tribunal.404 No court or other legal authority would use the standard 
as a basis for legal action because the parties never intended to enter 
into an enforceable agreement. 
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 Furthermore, because the agreements are not legally enforce-
able, nations can vary in their own interpretation and implementation 
of the standards. No central authority mandates a particular interpre-
tation; therefore, nations can implement the standards with greater 
ºexibility. For example, the recently announced Revised Capital Ac-
cord is intended to apply only to internationally active banks, yet the 
Basel Committee has never speciªcally deªned what constitutes an 
“internationally active bank.”405 The United States has stated that the 
provisions of the Revised Capital Accord will only apply to interna-
tionally active banks (probably the largest thirty or so banks in the 
United States).406 In contrast, the EU is planning to enact a directive 
that requires all banks within the EU to meet the capital requirements 
under the Revised Capital Accord.407 Thus, the EU and the United 
States have interpreted the applicability of the Revised Capital Accord 
in divergent manners. 
 Traditionally, the Basel Committee has relied on peer pressure 
among its members to enforce its standards, including the Core Prin-
ciples. Bank regulators that freely agree to standards and fail to im-
plement them will likely suffer a loss of reputation within the Com-
mittee.408 Given the Basel Committee’s constant activity reviewing 
ªnancial supervisory practices around the world, a failure to imple-
ment a standard in good faith would likely weaken a nation’s position 
with respect to future negotiations on new or revised standards. 
A. Financial Sector Assessment Program 
 The IMF and the World Bank have taken on the role of assessing 
nations’ compliance with international ªnancial standards.409 The 
IMF has identiªed twelve key standards, one of which is the Core 
                                                                                                                      
405 Revised Capital Accord, supra note 48, at 1. 
406 Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities: Quantitative Impact Study, 69 
Fed. Reg. 50, 442 (Aug. 16, 2004); see Roger W. Ferguson, Vice Chairman of the Federal 
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Principles, as benchmarks of its assessment program.410 In the late 
1990s, the IMF organized an assessment program that focused solely 
on a nation’s implementation of these standards.411 The IMF and the 
World Bank typically send a team of experienced bank supervisors to 
a nation to evaluate the nation’s compliance with these standards. 
The IMF then issues its ªndings from this inspection in documents 
entitled Reports on Standards and Codes (“ROSC”).412
 Subsequently, in 1999, with the cooperation of the World Bank, 
the IMF expanded and strengthened the ROSC program by creating 
the FSAP.413 The FSAP takes a broader assessment of the overall 
ªnancial stability and soundness of a nation’s ªnancial system and 
reviews the nation’s ªscal and monetary policies.414 A component of 
this assessment is a review of the implementation of the twelve key 
standards,415 and, in determining the level of complaince with these 
standards, the FSAP team compares both the letter of the law and ac-
tual practice.416
 The IMF publishes the FSAP reports and the ROSC on a particu-
lar country only if that country agrees to publication.417 Publication 
of these reports is needed to increase transparency of bank regulatory 
systems and improve market discipline. Unfortunately, countries do 
not always consent. In the report on the forty-two offshore ªnancial 
centers, only twenty-two of the jurisdictions had consented to publica-
tion of the FSAP report as of April 2004.418
 In 2003, the IMF Board considered instituting a policy of publish-
ing all FSAP reports but decided to maintain its current policy of pub-
lishing these reports only with the permission of the nation as-
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sessed.419 Nevertheless, the IMF did agree to publish the annual Arti-
cle IV surveillance reports of each member nation beginning July 1, 
2004.420 Article IV surveillance refers to reviews of member nations’ 
foreign exchange policies, as required by Article IV of the IMF Arti-
cles of Agreement.421 In recent years, these surveillance reports have 
expanded into an overall review of the monetary policy, ªscal policy, 
and ªnancial services sector of a particular nation. In the past, the 
IMF only published the Article IV reports with the permission of the 
nation assessed.422
 Publication of the FSAP reports and the ROSCs improves the 
transparency of national regulatory practices and the soundness of na-
tional ªnancial systems. The IMF and World Bank encourage publica-
tion of these reports,423 as do other standard–setting bodies, such as the 
Financial Stability Forum.424 A refusal to agree to the publication of the 
report by the assessed country may indicate serious non-compliance 
with the standards. Presumably, a jurisdiction complying with the Core 
Principles and other standards, or making good progress in compliance 
with the standards, would want to advertise that fact. 
 Credit rating agencies, such as Fitch Ratings and Standard and 
Poor’s, review the publicly available reports on compliance with stan-
dards when determining a country’s sovereign rating.425 Compliance 
with international ªnancial standards is a positive factor in rating a 
nation’s ability to repay its debt.426 A better credit rating typically re-
duces the interest rate that a country must pay on its sovereign debt. 
This reduction in the interest rate and, thus, borrowing costs, pro-
vides an incentive for nations to comply with standards and to agree 
to publish the independent assessment of the IMF. 
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  For example, emerging market countries’ compliance with these 
standards is linked to higher credit ratings and lower spreads.427 After 
examining data on ratings and spreads from twenty-nine countries, 
researchers at the IMF concluded: 
Our ªndings suggest that improved adherence to standards, 
and the higher ratings that result, could help a country miti-
gate the impact of an external crisis by supporting continued 
access to external borrowing. Adherence can help prevent cri-
ses by reducing spreads and helping the authorities remain 
solvent in cases it otherwise might not have remained sol-
vent.428
Other IMF reports likewise conªrm that compliance with interna-
tional ªnancial standards improves sovereign credit ratings and de-
creases borrowing costs.429
B. Revised Capital Accord 
 The Revised Capital Accord provides another opportunity to en-
force the Core Principles. Pillar I of the Revised Capital Accord 
deªnes methods for calculating the minimum required capital for 
banks.430 Under the standardized method described in Pillar I, banks 
may use the ratings by external credit assessment agencies to calculate 
risk weights for sovereign debt and for debt owed by corporations and 
banks.431 The higher the sovereign rating, the lower the risk weight 
and the lower the amount of capital allocated to that particular 
credit.432 The credit rating agencies consider compliance with inter-
national ªnancial standards, including the Core Principles, in deter-
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mining ratings.433 Rating agencies review and evaluate ROSCs and 
FSAP reports, among other sources of information, in determining 
sovereign ratings.434 By complying with international ªnancial stan-
dards, national governments make their debt, and loans to corporate 
borrowers in that nation, more attractive to international banks, be-
cause those banks can allocate less capital to those loans and, there-
fore, increase their proªt margins on the loans. 
 The standardized method also allows banks to consider export 
credit insurance ratings in determining risk weights.435 Export credit 
insurance provides coverage in the event that a nation prevents pay-
ments for exports.436 The insurance premium is dependent on many 
factors, one of which is the stability of the nation’s ªnancial and po-
litical system.437 In calculating insurance premiums, export credit in-
surance agencies consider a nation’s compliance with international 
ªnancial standards, including the Core Principles, and will review any 
available ROSCs or FSAP reports.438
 Thus, the provisions of the Revised Capital Accord provide an 
incentive for nations to implement the Core Principles. Full imple-
mentation of the Core Principles will lower borrowing costs for coun-
tries, and the borrowers located therein, and reduce the export credit 
insurance premiums that exporters will pay for coverage. Banks and 
international businesses therefore have an incentive to exert political 
pressure on governments to comply with these international ªnancial 
standards in order to reduce these costs of doing business. Interna-
tional banks and businesses will focus their operations on countries 
that have complied with international ªnancial standards in order to 
lower their interest payments on loans and export credit insurance 
premiums, respectively. 
 One weakness of reliance on sovereign ratings, however, is that 
rating agencies do not necessarily analyze all nations. Fitch Ratings is-
sued sovereign ratings for approximately ninety countries in 2004.439 
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Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s analyzed approximately 100 coun-
tries each.440 The IMF currently has 184 member nations.441 Thus, ap-
proximately seventy jurisdictions are not currently rated by one of these 
three major credit rating agencies.442 The largest and most important 
countries are rated (sometimes by all three agencies), but some less 
developed nations are not rated and therefore will be unable to take 
advantage of the lower risk weight categories. The Revised Capital Ac-
cord places loans to non-rated countries in the 100% risk weight cate-
gory.443 Nevertheless, credit rating agencies will likely expand their cov-
erage in the near future, so unrated nations obviously have an incentive 
to encourage agencies to evaluate them for a rating.444
 The second pillar of the Revised Capital Accord focuses on the 
prudential supervision of a bank’s risk management methods.445 Pillar 
II refers to the Core Principles as part of the overall supervisory proc-
ess, and states that the Revised Capital Accord complements “the ex-
tensive supervisory guidance” in the Core Principles and the Method-
ology.446 In other words, a review of capital adequacy is not a stand-
alone process, but is part of the overall supervision of banks. Bank 
supervisors should apply other supervisory guidance issued by the 
Basel Committee in addition to the minimum capital adequacy levels 
of the Revised Capital Accord.447
C. IMF and World Bank Loan Conditions 
 Conditionality of loans by the IMF and the World Bank provides 
another enforcement mechanism for the Core Principles. After the 
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Mexican ªnancial crisis in 1994, the IMF and its member nations cre-
ated a special lending facility for use by nations in ªnancial distress— 
the New Arrangements to Borrow (“NAB”).448 Under this new facility, 
the IMF can issue loans to provide liquidity to national economies.449 
One of the conditions of lending from any of the IMF loan facilities, 
including the NAB, is compliance with international ªnancial stan-
dards or an agreement to implement such standards.450 One objective 
behind the IMF loan program is to improve the operation of national 
ªnancial sectors, one aspect of which is compliance with international 
ªnancial standards.451 Of course, a weakness of this enforcement 
method is that compliance is obtained only after a crisis occurs. Ide-
ally, countries should comply with international standards in an effort 
to prevent such ªnancial crises in the ªrst place. 
IV. Next Steps 
 The enforcement capabilities of the Core Principles have im-
proved since the 1980s. While enforcement of the Core Principles does 
not approach the level of enforcement available with binding interna-
tional treaties, signiªcant improvements in enforcement mechanisms 
have been made. 
 What are the next steps in international bank regulation and su-
pervisory cooperation? As the chart in Appendix A and the discussion 
above show, the history of the Basel Committee standards indicates 
that standards are developed and then improved in incremental steps. 
The Basel Committee has typically reacted to bank and ªnancial crises 
by amending and improving international standards. It has not issued 
standards in a proactive attempt to anticipate weaknesses in the inter-
national ªnancial system. 
 This reactive approach to standard setting has resulted in stan-
dards that are increasingly detailed in their language, while at the 
same time increasingly broad in their scope. The Basel Committee 
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initially issued standards related only to the cooperation of supervi-
sors in cross-border banking. Since the Concordat, however, the stan-
dards have become steadily more detailed. Then, at the urging of the 
G-7, the Basel Committee issued broad standards for the entire bank 
supervisory system, not just for the international coordination of bank 
supervision, with the Core Principles in 1997. 
 With regard to capital adequacy, the Basel Committee issued the 
original Capital Accord in 1988. This accord set substantive minimum 
capital levels, marking the ªrst time that bank regulators had ever 
agreed on such a standard. The Revised Capital Accord, issued in 
June 2004, further develops and revises these standards on minimum 
capital adequacy. 
 Given the Basel Committee’s history, incremental change and im-
provement to the standards will likely continue to be the trend in the 
development of international bank regulation. Nations tend to be cau-
tious about regulating their ªnancial sectors because of the importance 
of ªnancial institutions to national economies, especially in emerging 
markets. Agreeing to an international standard potentially means a loss 
of national sovereignty, something to which nations are generally very 
reluctant to concede. Nevertheless, broader and more detailed interna-
tional standards will be the norm, if for no other reason than improved 
technology will further increase trade in ªnancial services, pushing na-
tions to revise and expand international ªnancial standards in order to 
improve the stability of an increasingly global ªnancial system. 
 Is an international treaty on banking regulation likely in the next 
decade? While the possibility cannot be ruled out, agreement on a 
treaty is unlikely in the near future.452 The international ªnancial sys-
tem changes quickly as new products are introduced and new markets 
develop. Treaties are viewed as too rigid to accommodate these rapid 
changes.453 In addition, in the event of a ªnancial crisis, bank supervi-
sors desire ºexibility to craft a solution to the crisis and fear that a 
treaty may unexpectedly and unduly restrict their responsiveness.454 
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proach To Sovereign Debt Restructuring 1–5 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
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Nevertheless, a treaty does have numerous enforcement mechanisms 
that are not available with voluntary international standards. 
 In 1998, Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, pro-
posed a new international body to improve stability in the interna-
tional ªnancial system.455 This agency would combine the responsi-
bilities of the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF, and the 
World Bank.456 The idea went nowhere. No supranational body regu-
lating the international ªnancial system is likely in the near future 
because of nations’ concerns regarding a loss of sovereignty.457 The 
EU, in implementing its Financial Services Action Plan and the Lam-
falussy Process, is approaching the creation of a supranational regula-
tor of ªnancial services. Even there, member states and the European 
Parliament are setting limits on the extent of convergence.458 Under 
the EU’s founding documents, the member states have transferred 
their sovereign power in certain areas to the EU, but not the pruden-
tial supervision of banks and credit institutions.459
 Many commentators applaud the establishment of the Financial 
Stability Forum and expect it to become more prominent in the 
ªnancial regulatory arena.460 The goal of the Financial Stability Fo-
rum is to coordinate the international regulation of the banking, in-
surance, and securities sectors as ªnancial institutions frequently pro-
vide all three types of services.461 Regulators are often organized 
along sectoral lines and therefore do not easily cooperate in the su-
pervision of complex ªnancial institutions that operate in all three 
lines of business. As these institutions increasingly offer all types of 
ªnancial services in such an integrated manner, sectoral supervision is 
beginning to make less sense. The consolidated supervision of these 
complex ªnancial institutions becomes more difªcult and can place 
excessive regulatory costs on ªnancial institutions that have to pre-
pare and ªle multiple reports with several different regulatory agen-
cies. 
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 Emerging markets, such as India, China, and certain Latin Ameri-
can countries, will likely continue to become more involved in the Basel 
Committee process. Emerging market countries made a signiªcant 
contribution to the Basel Committee’s Core Principles462 and have con-
tinued to contribute to Basel Committee activities. The central banks 
from certain emerging markets, such as China and India, joined the 
Bank for International Settlements in 1996.463 As emerging markets 
become more important in the international ªnancial system, their in-
volvement and inºuence in the Basel process will undoubtedly grow. In 
1948, the developed nations (North America, Western Europe, and Ja-
pan) accounted for 58.8% of merchandise world trade, while emerging 
markets accounted for 6.9% of merchandise world trade.464 In 2002, 
the developed nations’ percentage of world trade was 64.1%, while the 
emerging markets’ percentage had increased to 9.5%465 In 1985, banks 
located in the G-7 nations accounted for 79.5% of all outstanding loans 
in the world. In 2003, the G-7 banks accounted for 61.5%—an 18% de-
crease.466 Although the G-7 banks predominate international lending, 
other banks, including those from emerging markets, are gaining mar-
ket share. Over the long run, emerging markets will very likely increase 
their share of international lending and world trade, gaining commen-
surate inºuence in the Basel Committee process. As stakeholders in 
this process, emerging markets will thus be more likely to implement 
the Core Principles and other international ªnancial standards on a 
consistent basis. 
Conclusion 
 The Core Principles have generally been a success in the devel-
oped world. They represent a logical evolution and expansion of the 
Basel Committee’s activities in light of the globalization of world 
ªnancial markets. The Basel Committee has involved regulators from 
the emerging markets more extensively in the past decade, but the 
Core Principles have thus far not been implemented as consistently in 
                                                                                                                      
462 Core Principles, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
463 Press Release, Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Invites Nine New Members to Join It 
(Sept. 9, 1996), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p9609096.htm. The BIS provides 
staff support to the Basel Committee. 
464 WTO, International Trade Statistics, II. Selected Long Term Trends (2003), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its2003_e.pdf. 
465 Id. 
466 Bank for Int’l Settlements, International Banking Statistics 52, tbl.8A ( June 2004), 
available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm. 
296 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 28:237 
emerging markets. Soft law is currently the principal approach to har-
monize bank regulation and supervisory practices (at least outside of 
the EU). The surveillance of international ªnancial standards compli-
ance by the IMF and the World Bank represents a new enforcement 
technique for the Core Principles and other key international ªnancial 
standards. The Revised Capital Accord itself reinforces the enforce-
ment of the Core Principles. The world undoubtedly will experience 
additional ªnancial crises in the future. The cooperation and trust 
among bank supervisors engendered by the process of negotiating the 
Core Principles, the Revised Capital Accord, and other international 
banking standards will increase the likelihood of an effective resolution 
of any future ªnancial crisis. 
 Appendix A 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Historical Development of Major Supervisory Standards 
Year 1975 1983 1988 1992 1997 1999 
Supervisory 
Standard 
Concordat 
Basel Committee 
formed in 1974 
Revised Concordat Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel I) 
Minimum 
Standards 
Core Principles for 
Effective Banking 
Supervision 
Revised Capital 
Adequacy 
Framework (June 
2004)—first draft 
circulated in June 
1999.  
       
Related Event Herstatt Bankhaus 
failed (1974); 
Franklin National 
Bank of New York 
failed (1974); 
British-Israel Bank 
of London failed 
(1974) 
Banco Ambrosiano 
failed (1982); de-
fault on Mexican 
sovereign debt 
(1982) 
 Bank of Commerce 
and Credit 
International 
(BCCI) failed 
(1991) 
G-7 Summit, Lyon, 
France (June 1996),
Barings Plc failed 
(Feb. 1995); Daiwa 
Bank branch in 
U.S. failed (Oct. 
1995) 
 
Asian financial 
crisis (1997); Long-
Term Capital Man-
agement failed 
(Sept. 1998); 
default on Russian 
debt (1998) 
 
 
